TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................. i

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1
  Background .......................................................................... 1
  The Impact of Hurricane Andrew ............................................ 1
  Readiness for Future Disasters Must be Improved ..................... 2
  Four Key Solutions Should be Implemented ................................. 2
  Relationships Among Federal, State, County and Municipal
    Governments Need to be Clearly Understood .......................... 3
  A General Principle for Planning .............................................. 4
  Definitions ........................................................................... 4
  Conclusion ........................................................................... 5

CHAPTER ONE: BEFORE THE STORM ............................................ 7
  I. COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................ 7
    Issue A: Public Education .................................................... 7
    Issue B: Pre-Disaster Communication with the Public ................. 8
    Issue C: Communications Among Emergency Response Agencies .... 10
  II. EVACUATION .................................................................. 12
    Issue A: Improve Evacuation Planning .................................... 12
    Issue B: Refuges of Last Resort ............................................ 15
    Issue C: Transportation Improvements ................................... 15
    Issue D: Marinas and Bridges .............................................. 18
  III. SHELTER ................................................................. 20
    Issue A: Improve Shelter Planning ........................................ 20
    Issue B: Increase Use of Public Buildings ............................... 22
    Issue C: Reduce Shelter Demand .......................................... 24
    Issue D: Improve Registration of Shelter Occupants .................. 27
    Issue E: Improve Sheltering of People with Special Needs ............ 27

CHAPTER TWO: AFTER THE STORM ............................................. 33
  I. POST-DISASTER COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC INFORMATION .. 33
    Issue A: Coordination of Emergency Communications .................. 34
    Issue B: Coordination of Post-Disaster Emergency Communications .... 36
    Issue C: Coordinating the Release of Information and Instructions to the Public . . . 41
II. POST-DISASTER RESPONSE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS ......... 44
   Issue A: Improve Planning for Post-Disaster Response and Recovery ...... 44
   Issue B: Improve Post-Disaster Intergovernmental Coordination .......... 56
   Issue C: Security ................................................. 60
   Issue D: Expand Civil Liability Protections ............................ 62
   Issue E: Improve Federal Programs .................................. 63

III. AVAILABILITY OF DAMAGE ASSESSMENT DATA ................. 66
    Issue A: Aerial and Ground Damage Assessments ...................... 66
    Issue B: Increase Use of Computerized Information Systems ............ 67

IV. MEDICAL CARE AND RELIEF ...................................... 70
    Issue A: Coordination of Medical Services ............................. 70
    Issue B: Statewide Medical Plan ...................................... 71
    Issue C: Emergency Pharmacies ...................................... 72

V. COORDINATION OF VOLUNTEERS, DONATIONS AND SUPPLIES .... 72
    Issue A: Effective Receipt and Distribution of Donations ............... 72
    Issue B: Coordination of Volunteers .................................. 72

CHAPTER THREE: FUNDING ............................................. 79

I. FLORIDA DEVOTES INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS ............. 79
    Issue A: Create an Emergency Management Preparedness and Disaster Assistance Trust Fund ............... 80

APPENDIX A: FISCAL NOTES .............................................. 83

APPENDIX B: RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES ................................ 103

APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF MEETINGS ................................. 109

APPENDIX D: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................... 113
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report contains the recommendations of the Governor's Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee for improving Florida's preparedness for and capability to recover from future disasters. The Committee examined preparedness before Hurricane Andrew and response and recovery efforts during the first two weeks after landfall. The 94 recommendations identify actions that should be taken by all levels of government, volunteer organizations, the media and selected professional organizations. Each recommendation is supported by comments and fiscal notes.

The Committee's report is organized into three chapters. These address pre-disaster issues, post-disaster issues, and the need for additional funding for emergency preparedness programs. It also contains an introduction and four appendixes.

The overall result of full implementation of the Committee's recommendations will be to give Florida one of the best emergency management systems in the United States. The implementation of our recommendations will reinforce local governments' capabilities to prepare for and respond to emergencies; ensure that the state has adequate plans, equipment, training, and personnel to respond quickly and effectively to disasters that exceed local resources; and provide for a clear chain of command and effective coordination among federal, state, and local governments and volunteer organizations.

Particularly critical to the accomplishment of the Committee's recommendations is the strengthening and expansion of disaster preparedness and recovery planning. This can be accomplished with existing resources or minimal additional investment. At the state level, the Department of Community Affairs should be the catalyst for and administrator of an effective state comprehensive emergency management plan. This plan should be created in coordination with all possible agencies, organizations, and associations because many other entities besides the Department of Community Affairs have vital roles and responsibilities under Florida's emergency preparedness and recovery plans and programs.

Recommendations in the first two chapters of this report enumerate specific criteria for operations-oriented elements addressing evacuation, shelter, and post-disaster response and recovery that should be included in the comprehensive state emergency management plan. Similar planning efforts should also be undertaken by all counties and by those municipalities that choose to establish emergency management agencies.

In implementing the Committee's recommendations pertaining to planning, at least five objectives should be met. First, plans should provide for a clear chain of command. Second, they should clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of individuals and organizations. Third, they should ensure that the designated individuals and organizations are trained to carry out their roles and
responsibilities. Fourth, the organization of federal, state, and local post-disaster and recovery teams should be generally aligned and parallel. Finally, the plans should prepare for disasters of different magnitude to ensure that response actions taken are appropriate given the magnitude of the disaster.

In addition, improving all aspects of communication at and among all levels of government and with the public and the media must be made a priority. Special attention must also be given to intergovernmental coordination, training, and funding. Numerous recommendations in this report speak to these issues.

The issue of funding is addressed in detail in this report. Readers will see that most of the Committee's recommendations can be implemented within existing resources or with modest additional investment in our emergency management system. Some recommendations will require substantial investment to carry out, but the cost of implementing these recommendations that are critical to saving lives and property is much lower than the cost of not acting.

The remainder of this executive summary describes the organization and contents of this report.

The Introduction provides some background on the Committee and presents some statistics on the impact of Hurricane Andrew. It also discusses some key conclusions of the Committee, such as the need to improve readiness for future disasters and the need to implement key solutions in the areas of communications, planning, intergovernmental coordination, training, and funding. The introduction concludes by discussing the importance of clearly understanding relationships among federal, state, county and municipal governments, outlining a general principle for planning efforts, and providing definitions of key terms used in the report.

Chapter One: Before the Storm contains three major sections: communications, evacuation, and shelter. Under communications, the Committee recommends actions for improving public education, pre-disaster communication with the public, and communications among emergency response agencies.

Under evacuation, the Committee recommends actions for improving evacuation planning, creating "refuges of last resort" programs, improving the ability of the transportation system to handle mass evacuations, and ensuring that policies for marinas and bridges put protecting life over property.

Under shelter, the Committee recommends actions for improving shelter planning and operations, increasing the ability to use public schools and other public buildings as shelters, reducing shelter demand, improving registration of shelter occupants, and improving procedures for sheltering people with special needs.
Chapter Two: After the Storm contains five major sections: post-disaster communications and public information, post-disaster response and recovery operations, availability of damage assessment data, medical care and relief, and coordination of volunteers, donations and supplies.

Under post-disaster communications and public information, the Committee recommends actions for improving coordination of emergency communications, coordination of post-disaster emergency communications, and coordinating the release of information and instructions to the public.

Under post-disaster response and recovery operations, the Committee recommends actions for improving planning for post-disaster response and recovery, enhancing post-disaster intergovernmental coordination, improving security, expanding civil liability protections, and improving federal programs.

Under availability of damage assessment data, the Committee recommends actions for improving aerial and ground damage assessments, and increasing the use of computerized information systems.

Under medical care and relief, the Committee recommends actions for improving coordination of medical services, creating a statewide medical plan, enhancing coordination of health care volunteers, and providing for emergency pharmacies.

Under coordination of volunteers, donations and supplies, the Committee recommends actions for improving effective receipt and distribution of donations and coordination of volunteers.

Chapter Three: Funding contains the Committee's observations that Florida devotes insufficient resources to emergency management programs. The Committee recommends that the Legislature create an emergency management preparedness and disaster assistance trust fund.

Appendix A: Fiscal Notes contains fiscal notes for each of the Committee's 94 recommendations.

Appendix B: Responsible Agencies identifies the agencies, organizations, associations, or entities identified in each recommendation or its associated comments as having a role or responsibilities in implementing the recommendation.

Appendix C: Summary of Meetings briefly describes the Committee's eight days of meetings.

Appendix D: Acknowledgements thanks certain individuals for their assistance to the Committee.
INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Hurricane Andrew dealt South Florida a devastating blow on August 24, 1992. The storm was the third most powerful to hit the United States in its recorded history, exceeded only by Camille in 1969 and the Labor Day Storm that struck the Florida Keys in 1935. It was also the costliest natural disaster ever in America, with estimates of damage exceeding $20 billion. Hurricane Andrew triggered an unprecedented response by federal, state and local governments and volunteer organizations.

To ensure Florida takes advantage of the lessons that can be learned from Hurricane Andrew to improve emergency preparedness and recovery programs, Governor Chiles issued Executive Order 92-291 to create the Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee on September 11, 1992. The Committee was assisted by a 25-member technical advisory committee of experts who were involved in the response to Hurricane Andrew.

The Committee met for eight days between October 1992 and January 1993 to evaluate the response to Hurricane Andrew and develop recommendations for improving Florida's emergency preparedness and recovery programs. All meetings were held in Dade County, Florida. The Committee received oral testimony from over 45 individuals who participated in the response to Hurricane Andrew. In addition, over 100 people, agencies, and organizations impacted by Andrew or active in response or recovery efforts submitted written recommendations for the Committee's consideration or provided comments on draft materials to assist the Committee.

THE IMPACT OF HURRICANE ANDREW

Hurricane Andrew slammed into South Florida at 5:05 a.m., August 24, 1992, damaging 1,100 square miles as it traveled across the peninsula and into the Gulf of Mexico. Classified as a category four storm, with sustained winds of 145 miles per hour and gusts of up to 175 miles per hour, Andrew battered the coast yet caused its most severe damage inland. The eye of Hurricane Andrew made landfall near the City of Homestead, the area hardest hit by the storm. Andrew's storm surge set a record high for Florida -- 16.9 feet in Biscayne Bay at S.W. 160th Street. The following facts highlight some of the impact of Hurricane Andrew:

**Impact of Hurricane Andrew in Florida**

- 28,066 Homes destroyed
- 107,380 Homes damaged
- 180,000 Persons left homeless
- 82,000 Businesses destroyed or damaged
- 32,900 Acres of farmland damaged
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Damage Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Public schools destroyed or damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Health facilities and hospitals damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>Traffic signs and signals damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>Miles of powerlines destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Watermains damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 mil</td>
<td>Residents lost electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>Residents lost telephone service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, virtually all economic activity in the devastated south Dade area ceased following the storm. The heaviest damage was inflicted on the south Dade area, home to 8,000 of the nearly 60,000 businesses in Dade County and 120,000 jobs. As of September 24, 1992, an estimated 86,000 people were out of work and 7,800 businesses were closed, at least temporarily. Tourism -- a $500 million per year industry -- will likely be severely impacted in the coming years because of damage to hotels, restaurants, and parks and travel industry perceptions. There is uncertainty about the reopening of Homestead Air Force Base, which was severely damaged by the storm. The base accounted for 14,000 military and civilian jobs and annually contributed more than $400 million to the local economy. Approximately 80,000 military retirees shopped at the base. Damage to agriculture is estimated at $1 billion, with a permanent income loss of $250 million and $580 million in damage to structures.

**READINESS FOR FUTURE DISASTERS MUST BE IMPROVED**

It would be erroneous and dangerous to assume that another storm the size of Andrew may not hit Florida again in the near future. Even though it has been 32 years since Florida has experienced a category four storm (Donna hit the Keys in 1960), the 1940s saw nine hurricanes with sustained winds of 110 mph or greater make landfall in Florida. The possibility of hurricane landfalls is a seasonal fact of life for all Floridians. In fact, hurricane researchers predict that Florida is at risk to be hit by more frequent and stronger storms in coming years as compared to the past two decades. An important motivation for correcting deficiencies discovered in the response and recovery to Hurricane Andrew should be the realistic expectation that another hurricane will visit Florida soon.

The power of Hurricane Andrew and the extent of the disaster brings home the reality of the state's role in preparing for and responding to disasters. Damage to homes and the disruption of peoples' lives is a significant legacy of Andrew. Therefore, it is imperative that Florida acknowledge the urgency of the need to prepare for the inevitable next storm. This report of the Governor's Disaster Planning and Response Review Committee offers recommendations for improving preparedness and recovery activities based on an examination of preparedness just before the storm and recovery actions in the first two weeks after the storm.

**FOUR KEY SOLUTIONS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED**
Foremost, the Committee commends all participants in the response to Hurricane Andrew. Given the magnitude of the devastation, the effectiveness of the effort to respond to and recover from Hurricane Andrew represents a triumph of the human spirit over significant adversity.

Before another disaster hits Florida, however, many steps should be taken to improve preparedness and recovery programs. During the Committee's work, four key solutions to the problems uncovered were repeatedly identified. These solutions are:

- Improve communications at, and among, all levels of government;
- Strengthen plans for evacuation, shelter, and post-disaster response and recovery;
- Enhance intergovernmental coordination; and
- Improve training.

In addition to these four solutions, making sufficient funding available for emergency management plans and activities is a critical need. Many improvements can be made to existing programs using existing resources. Increasing the funding available for emergency preparedness and recovery programs is essential, however, for implementing some key solutions recommended by the Committee and for bringing existing programs up to satisfactory performance levels. Chapter Three discusses the issue of funding in more detail. Appendix A contains fiscal notes to assist readers in estimating the fiscal impact of each of the Committee's recommendations.

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG FEDERAL, STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS NEED TO BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD

The Committee spent a considerable amount of time grappling with the difficult issue of chain of command. The roles and responsibilities of federal and state agencies seem reasonably well understood and defined. These governments provide assistance to local governments and the public when local resources are inadequate to meet demands upon them. The Committee has offered many recommendations that will, if implemented, improve performance at the state and federal level in responding to future disasters.

On the other hand, the relationships among, and roles and responsibilities of, county and municipal governments do not seem to be similarly well understood and defined. Counties are charged in the Florida Statutes with being responsible for maintaining emergency preparedness programs for the entire county. Municipalities have the option under Chapter 252, F.S., to establish emergency management agencies and programs, but are not required to do so. For this reason, it cannot be presumed that all cities will assume similar roles and responsibilities prior to, during, or after disasters.

The Committee has, therefore, directed its recommendations primarily to county governments, which are ultimately accountable for meeting the needs of all impacted residents with the county. If a municipality has an emergency management agency and program, the Committee believes that it should
meet standards similar to those outlined for counties in this report. In addition, the Committee recommends that the emergency preparedness plans of municipalities should be consistent with and subject to the applicable county plans to ensure that close cooperation and coordination will exist in each county during disaster situations.

A GENERAL PRINCIPLE FOR PLANNING

The Committee recommends that a general principle guide emergency preparedness and recovery planning: Florida should plan differently for disasters of different magnitude. Specifically, the Committee recommends that Florida and its counties adopt plans tailored to minor, major, and catastrophic disasters.

The needs of citizens and communities following emergencies vary given the intensity and scale of disaster incidents. Therefore, planning for response and recovery should vary similarly. State, regional and local preparedness and recovery plans should contain guidelines for action for each category of disaster. The need to plan differently for disasters of different magnitude is a recurring theme in this report. It is recommended that the state and local governments use the following categories in planning efforts.¹

À **Minor disasters** means disasters that are likely to be within the response capabilities of local government and to result in only a minimal need for state and federal assistance, such as a tropical storm or limited flooding.

À **Major disasters** means disasters that will likely exceed local capabilities and require a broad range of state and federal assistance, such as a category one to three hurricane.

À **Catastrophic disasters** means disasters that will require massive state and federal assistance, including immediate military involvement, such as a category four or five hurricane that hits a densely populated area.

DEFINITIONS

The terms used in this report mean the following to the Committee:

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¹ Indications are that the federal government is considering using three classes of magnitude (Classes A, B, and C) in its emergency preparedness and response planning. In the event this is implemented, Florida should conform, to the extent appropriate for the State of Florida, its definitions of disaster categories to those used by the federal government.
Disaster means any natural, technological, or civil emergency that results in a declaration of a state of emergency by a county, by the Governor, or by the President.

Evacuation means activities whereby residents and visitors are moved from dangerous areas to safer areas.

Local government means county and city governments, unless the context clearly indicates that school boards and special districts are included.

Mitigation means activities designed to postpone, eliminate or reduce the effects of disasters before they occur.

Post-Disaster Redevelopment means the long-term process of rebuilding an impacted area’s social, physical and economic infrastructure following a disaster.

Preparedness means the readiness of emergency management agencies and other emergency responders to handle evacuation, shelter, response, and recovery operations.

Recovery means activities designed to mitigate physical damage caused by disasters and restore essential facilities and services to pre-disaster conditions. The recovery phase overlaps the response period, but typically begins about three days after a disaster incident, and can last for an indefinite period.

Response means activities taken immediately before, during, and immediately after a disaster to assure personal survival, alleviate human suffering, and ensure public safety.

Shelter means the process of moving residents and visitors into safe structures for temporary periods and meeting the needs of individuals while they are in the shelters.

Should means shall or must, depending on the context. The Committee recognizes that it is an advisory body that has no authority to compel action. It has, therefore, used the term "should" in this report to describe actions that it believes must be taken.

CONCLUSION

The recommendations of the Committee will, if implemented, improve preparedness for and response to all types of future disasters. Because the disaster that led to the creation of the Committee was a catastrophic hurricane, implementation of these recommendations will especially improve Florida’s hurricane preparedness and recovery programs. Readers should keep in mind that Hurricane Andrew was a relatively dry hurricane, bringing with it an average of three to six inches of rainfall. Therefore, the potential impact of serious flooding was not discussed in detail during the series of
meetings conducted by the Committee. The potential implications of flooding must also be considered in future planning efforts.

This report is organized as follows: Chapter One addresses pre-disaster activities, including evacuation and shelter issues. Chapter Two addresses post-disaster issues. Chapter Three addresses funding.
CHAPTER ONE: BEFORE THE STORM

The Committee focused on three key issues in its examination of activities before Hurricane Andrew: communications, evacuation, and shelter. Our recommendations for improvements in these issue areas follow below.

I. COMMUNICATIONS

Issue A: Public Education

Hurricane Andrew has taught Florida's state and county emergency management agencies and other responders a tremendous amount about how to be prepared for, respond to and recover from disasters. Most of these agencies will be implementing significant improvements in plans and programs, some of which are recommended in this report, to put into practice the lessons they have learned before the next hurricane season.

In addition, Hurricane Andrew brought home to Floridians the destructive power of a hurricane. Unfortunately, Andrew's severity and extensive wind damage outside of surge zones may cause a much larger segment of the population to evacuate before the next hurricane than predicted by behavioral studies conducted prior to Andrew. This implies a strong need for public education efforts to focus on helping people to understand how to retrofit and secure their homes and property so that they will be safe at home and, possibly, be willing to remain there. Florida must now be concerned with encouraging people not in evacuation zones to not evacuate unless directed so we can avoid large numbers of people being caught on evacuation routes when hurricanes hit.

Recommendation #1:

The Department of Community Affairs should work with Florida's counties, cities, the media and interested associations and organizations to develop and implement a comprehensive, multimedia, and multilingual public information campaign on emergency preparedness issues.

Comments:

a. The campaign should help people to understand risks associated with different disasters, emphasize techniques for preparing homes for hurricanes, and encourage people to stay home or to head to local shelters unless specifically advised to take other actions by the Governor or county emergency management personnel. Information should also be provided on supplies and equipment that should be brought to shelters and guidance for actions to be taken during and after disasters. In addition, the campaign should educate people about how to prearrange shelter for their pets in the event they are given an order to evacuate.
b. The campaign should be designed to reach sight- and hearing-impaired individuals.

c. The campaign should also be designed to provide a consistent level of information throughout the year, with information efforts intensifying just prior to and during hurricane season.

d. The Department of Community Affairs and counties should enter into a dialogue with the Florida Association of Broadcasters and the Florida Radio-Television News Directors Association to determine how to produce informational announcements and stories that can run on a continuing basis.

e. In addition to traditional media tools, this campaign should result in providing essential information in utility or tax bills, on grocery bags, tray liners, milk cartons, and through other nonconventional methods.

f. Efforts should also be made to coordinate with public schools to include emergency preparedness issues on school curricula.

Issue B: Pre-Disaster Communication with the Public

The Committee found that the early warning and public notification process before the storm worked well. The following recommendations are intended to supplement an effective system.

Recommendation # 2:

The Department of Community Affairs, county emergency operations agencies, voluntary organizations and the local mass media should cooperatively develop procedures to use the Weather Channel, CNN, and the mass media to broadcast emergency information to the public. These procedures should provide for coordinated points of release of information to the media, perhaps from the state emergency operations center and largest at-risk county emergency operations center.

Comments:

a. Efforts to provide emergency information to the public can be enhanced by facilitating media access to information. The procedures should establish a standardized format for the release of information, which would be transmitted to all activated emergency operations centers within a media market (region). This would allow large and small media outlets alike to access the most current, accurate information for release. The procedures should also provide for ensuring a continuous flow of information through coordinated release points as efforts shift to post-storm activities. (Post-storm communications procedures are addressed in Chapter 2, recommendation # 47.)
b. The local mass media and government access channels should be used to relay emergency warning information to people within at-risk areas. The Weather Channel, CNN and other national news media should be used to provide general updates and information to people outside of at-risk areas.

c. The Weather Channel requires information to be submitted to it by a state emergency management agency. The Department of Community Affairs should rapidly review information being submitted to avoid major errors without slowing the distribution of important information. Information should be prescripted whenever possible.

Recommendation # 3:

Counties should work with telephone companies to have emergency information and instructions that are not subject to change published in telephone directories.

Comments:

a. Local telephone directories have historically been used as a source of information and instructions for the public. It is important, however, to only publish information that is not likely to change because of the long lead times needed to print directories and because of the staggered times for updating directories among the different counties. The following types of information should be considered for inclusion in telephone books:

(1) important emergency telephone numbers;

(2) maps of evacuation areas and flood-prone areas;

(3) locations of predesignated information centers and other critical disaster response sites;

(4) key definitions and terminology, e.g., hurricane warning, hurricane watch;

(5) instructions and precautions for preparing homes for disasters, especially hurricanes, and for guiding actions during and after disasters;

(6) local radio and television stations for emergency information;

(7) hurricane evacuation routes;

(8) guidelines for determining when it is safe to stay at home instead of evacuating;

(9) guidelines for donating goods in response to disasters; and
a description of the nonelectronic communications system that will be used if electronic communications are not possible (see recommendation # 50).

b. Emergency management officials and voluntary organizations should work to stabilize shelter locations to the point that shelter locations eventually can be safely included in telephone books.

**Recommendation # 4:**

**The Department of Community Affairs should conduct an assessment of the Florida Emergency Broadcast System.**

**Comments:**

a. The Florida Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) consists of a small number of radio stations that volunteer to participate as an EBS station.

b. Before any additional funding is made available for improvements to this system, an assessment should be conducted to determine if it is effective, identify ways to increase the coverage of the system and its use by state and local emergency management officials, and evaluate methods to improve the rapid dissemination of emergency warnings and notification to the widest audience, including automatic "all channel" (including cable) broadcast overrides.

c. The Department of Community Affairs should work with county emergency management agencies, the media and other interested parties during this effort, including the State Emergency Communications Committee, which drafted the original Florida Emergency Broadcast System plan.

**Issue C: Communications Among Emergency Response Agencies**

**Recommendation # 5:**

**The Florida Legislature should provide funding to ensure that each county emergency management agency in Florida is linked to the National Warning System.**

**Comments:**

a. Presently, 49 of Florida's 67 counties have the National Warning System, which is a landline-based telephone system. Those counties without the National Warning System are predominantly the smaller, less populated, rural counties (Gadsden, Jefferson, Liberty, Washington, Wakulla, Baker, Clay, Flagler, Gilchrist, Hamilton, Madison, Suwannee, Union,
Taylor, Hardee, Sumter, Osceola, and Glades) that cannot afford the recurring monthly line charge of $500 or more.

b. Fortunately, the Federal Emergency Management Agency is making system upgrades that could lower costs.

c. The Legislature should only provide this funding if it is willing to commit to funding the recurring costs associated with keeping the system operating or if arrangements can be made with the applicable counties or the federal government to cover all or part of the recurring costs.

Recommendation # 6:

The National Warning System should remain as the primary means of communications among federal, state, and county emergency management officials and the National Hurricane Center.

Comments:

a. Because of its "conference call" capability, the National Warning System represents the most effective means of communicating information on weather conditions and coordinating emergency operations in response to that information. The National Warning System conference calls were used effectively by state and county emergency management officials during Hurricane Andrew to keep track of the storm and to coordinate protective actions.

Recommendation # 7:

The 1993 Legislature should appropriate sufficient funds to provide high frequency radios within each county's designated 24-hour warning point to serve as a back-up to the National Warning System.

Comments:

a. Because the National Warning System is landline-based, there needs to be reliable and effective back-up systems in place that are not landline-based. High frequency radios will allow for direct radio communications among the state emergency operations center and each county when landline-based communications systems fail.

b. Provision must be made for emergency power sources in the event of power outages.

c. Provision must be made for training operators.
Recommendation # 8:

The 1993 Legislature should appropriate sufficient funds to install local government radios (LGRs) with remote capability within each county's designated 24-hour warning point to serve as a back-up to their high frequency radios.

Comments:

a. The LGR system is a short range (approximate radius of 25 miles) that links county emergency management agencies into a statewide network. Many of the existing LGRs used by counties are extremely old and unreliable. Most of the antennas are located on buildings too low to allow good communications. The purchase of LGRs with remote capabilities would allow the antenna to be appropriately placed away from the transceiver and connected by a telephone line, which should improve its effectiveness.

b. The Legislature should only provide this funding if it is willing to commit to funding the recurring costs associated with keeping the system operating or if arrangements can be made with the applicable counties or the federal government to cover all or part of the recurring costs.

II. EVACUATION

Hurricane Andrew necessitated the evacuation of nearly 750,000 persons from Monroe, Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties. Many people in the flood-prone areas of Lee and Collier counties also voluntarily evacuated. The evacuation contributed to the minimal loss of life experienced given the strength of the storm. The evacuation system was not put to the ultimate test, however, as a relatively small populated area was subjected to life-threatening flooding.

Issue A: Improve Evacuation Planning

Recommendation # 9:

The Department of Community Affairs should adopt a revised evacuation element, which includes specific regional and interregional planning provisions, as part of the state comprehensive emergency management plan by March 1, 1994.

Comments:

a. The revised state evacuation element should be operations-oriented and be based on the regional hurricane evacuation studies and county evacuation plans.
b. The state element should provide policy guidance on lifting tolls on state highways, handling evacuees crossing county lines, sheltering people caught on evacuation routes, and ensuring sufficient, reasonably priced, fueling locations along evacuation routes.

**Recommendation # 10:**

**The Department of Community Affairs should amend Chapter 9G-7, Florida Administrative Code, to ensure that county evacuation plans are coordinated with the revised state comprehensive emergency management plan.**

Comments:

a. In addition to their current components, county evacuation plans should address coordination among adjacent counties in handling evacuees, contingency plans for sheltering people caught on evacuation routes, and provision of adequate fueling locations along evacuation routes.

b. These plans should contain plans to cut off access to transportation corridors to ensure that cars are not allowed to enter roadways that they cannot clear safely.

c. The plans should identify roads on which tolls should be lifted in the event an evacuation is ordered.

**Recommendation # 11:**

**The Legislature should require hospitals, nursing homes, adult congregate living facilities, group homes, and other health or residential care facilities that house people with special needs, to maintain evacuation plans as a condition of their licenses.**

Comments:

a. Institutions cannot take their residents to public shelters. Public shelters are not equipped to handle them.

b. The Legislature should require that the applicable county emergency management agency approve facilities' plans annually as a condition of licensing or certification by the Agency for Health Care Administration. These plans should, at a minimum, ensure that patients' needs are adequately addressed, identify prearranged locations where residents will be taken, and provide for patient transportation.

c. Based on the crowding that occurred prior to Hurricane Andrew, institutions should have multiple options for evacuating patients (at least two potential host facilities).
d. First priority should be given to retrofitting and equipping institutional buildings outside of the category three surge zone and low-lying areas so that they do not have to evacuate. At a minimum, facilities in at-risk areas should be required to elevate essential equipment above anticipated surge levels.

e. The Committee recognizes that facilities that have taken steps to reduce the need for hurricane evacuation would have a lesser need for hurricane evacuation plans. These facilities should still maintain evacuation plans for other types of disasters, e.g., radiological, hazardous materials spill.

f. Institutional staff training to handle evacuations should be an integral part of hurricane preparedness plans.

g. The legislation should provide that when facilities listed above and other facilities statutorily charged with responsibility for managing medicines for residents are required to evacuate residents to hospitals or other special care facilities or shelters, each resident must be accompanied by medical records, specifically including physician medical and pharmacy orders, and by the physician-approved medicines for that resident.

Recommendation # 12:

The Agency for Health Care Administration should enforce severe penalties, at a minimum to include loss of license, fines, or probationary measures, for residential care facilities that house people with special needs that fail to follow their approved evacuation plans.

Comments:

a. The Committee received testimony that one or more nursing homes "dumped" patients at public shelters. Such unconscionable acts should be dealt with promptly and severely.

b. The Committee recognizes that facilities that have taken steps to reduce the need for hurricane evacuation would have a lesser need for hurricane evacuation plans. These facilities should still maintain evacuation plans for other types of disasters, e.g., radiological, hazardous materials spill.
Issue B: Refuges of Last Resort

Recommendation # 13:

The Legislature should amend Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, to direct the Department of Community Affairs to establish a statewide refuge of last resort strategy.

Comments:

a. Coastal counties should be required to establish refuge of last resort programs for their coastal high hazard areas.

b. Refuge of last resort strategies should include surveying private and public buildings that could serve as refuges, retrofitting potential refuges that are located outside of surge zones, and incorporating refuge of last resort standards in local building codes for new structures.

c. The Legislature should amend appropriate provisions of the Florida Statutes to limit the liability of owners of qualified structures that allow their structures to be used as refuges of last resort.

d. The Committee expressly recognizes that refuges of last resort are not shelters.

e. This recommendation was not supported by the county emergency management officials who served on the Technical Advisory Committee.

Issue C: Transportation Improvements

Even during the relatively smooth evacuation prior to Hurricane Andrew, substantial traffic problems occurred. Some of these problems can be avoided through inexpensive actions that are described below.

In addition, the Committee reemphasizes the need for an aggressive program of public education to ameliorate the expected over-reaction (and over-evacuation) prior to the next hurricane. But even with this public educational effort, testimony provided to the Committee indicates that many people will evacuate next time. Florida must be ready to do all it can to avoid loss of life due to individuals trapped on transportation facilities.

Recommendation # 14:

The Florida Department of Transportation should implement a rule by June 1, 1993, for the automatic lifting of tolls on state toll facilities when an evacuation order is issued by county or state officials.
Comments:

a. Prior to Hurricane Andrew, the Florida Department of Transportation obtained authorization to lift tolls on Florida's Turnpike after an order to evacuate was issued by local officials. Authorization to lift tolls on other toll facilities was granted later in the evacuation. The delay in lifting tolls resulted in long lines at toll plazas. If automatic authorization to lift tolls was linked to an evacuation order, no separate authorization would be necessary. This would effectuate a more efficient evacuation.

b. The Florida Department of Transportation should use the county and regional evacuation studies to identify the toll roads that will be utilized for evacuation purposes and, therefore, on which tolls should be discontinued. For ease of implementation and simplicity to the public, all tolls throughout the length of the identified roadways should be lifted at the same time.

c. The Florida Department of Transportation should also examine the feasibility of using retractable toll booths, at least on the far right hand side, to facilitate mass evacuations through toll facilities and submit a report on the feasibility study to the Department of Community Affairs.

Recommendation # 15:

When circumstances warrant, the Florida Highway Patrol should have the authority to request the Florida Department of Transportation to lift tolls at specific locations prior to the automatic plan being implemented if a severe traffic problem develops.

Comments:

a. This understanding between the Florida Highway Patrol and the Florida Department of Transportation currently exists, but should be included in the FDOT's rule to confirm that the option exists when the need arises.

Recommendation # 16:

The Florida Department of Transportation should determine the technical feasibility of implementing a reversible lane system on Florida's limited access highways during an evacuation. This study should be completed by May 1, 1993, to allow for implementation, if appropriate, by June 1, 1993.

Comments:
a. The Florida Department of Transportation has initiated efforts to look at the feasibility of such a plan on Florida's Turnpike. Since a significant effort is required to determine its feasibility, including but not limited to, analyses of physical constraints, availability of manpower for traffic control, and other factors, the Committee recommends that the Florida Department of Transportation be given sufficient time to complete its study. In addition to the technical feasibility of this issue, the Florida Department of Transportation should evaluate the policy implications of having a reverse-laning system. A report on the feasibility study should be submitted to the Department of Community Affairs.

b. If determined to be appropriate on the Turnpike, the Florida Department of Transportation should subsequently consider other limited access facilities, such as I-95, I-75, I-4 and I-10.

Recommendation # 17:

The Florida Department of Transportation should expedite its construction plans to widen U.S. 1 between Key Largo and Florida City and to reconstruct a new high level bridge on U.S. 1 over Jewfish Creek.

Comments:

a. Currently U.S. 1 has four lanes through Key Largo and north of Florida City. The 20-mile section between Key Largo and Florida City only has two lanes, which creates a severe constraint to evacuation traffic flows. The existing roadway elevation is low and subject to flooding.

b. The Florida Department of Transportation has progressed in developing a project for four-laning this section. An Environmental Impact Statement has been approved and final design has commenced. It is recommended that the Florida Department of Transportation vigorously pursue completion of design and approval of required environmental permits in order to expedite the construction of this vital evacuation route.

Recommendation # 18:

The Florida Department of Transportation should perform an analysis of the State Highway System to determine which highways would cause a constraint to a regional evacuation effort. The FDOT should consider actions to reduce the effect of identified constraints.

Comments:

a. A cursory review of the highway system in Southeast Florida performed by the engineering consulting firm of Keith and Schnars, Inc., indicated that if a full northbound evacuation were to
take place, the flow of traffic would deteriorate within Palm Beach County due to lower capacity beyond the urbanized areas. The Florida Department of Transportation should review this study and perform a more thorough analysis statewide to determine where highway bottlenecks occur. This information should be used in county, regional, and state evacuation plans and studies.

b. Following the analysis, the Florida Department of Transportation should identify strategies, including new construction, reconstruction, transportation system management, and transportation demand management, for reducing the constraining effects of the bottlenecks.

c. Minor improvements to highways, such as widening shoulders, should also be considered to facilitate evacuations.

Recommendation # 19:

The Florida Department of Transportation should increase their supply of portable, programmable signs that can be used during mass evacuations and following disasters.

Comments:

a. A mass evacuation places significant stress on transportation networks. Programmable signs can be used to direct traffic to the least congested routes.

b. A major or catastrophic storm can destroy most signs and many landmarks. Re-entry into disaster areas can be improved through the use of programmable signs.

c. The programmable signs should have multilingual capability.

d. In addition, the Florida Department of Transportation and counties should consider initiating a program to stencil street names on curbs at major intersections.

Issue D: Marinas and Bridges

Many marinas in Florida have rules that require boat owners to remove their vessels when threatened by hurricanes. Boat owners that do not comply can lose their slips, which can be a significant penalty in some areas. The result of this policy, however, is that boat owners (especially out-of-town owners) are motivated to travel into areas being evacuated in order to move their boats, putting their lives at risk.

Prior to the landfall of Hurricane Andrew, the Florida Department of Transportation coordinated with the Dade County Emergency Operations Center and began locking down bridges and
securing gates in the early evening before the storm. This coordinated effort worked well. The plan previously in place calls for lock down to occur when sustained winds reached 39 mph. However, the speed that Andrew was traveling would have allowed only a few hours for lock down to occur had the previous plan been followed.

Recommendation # 20:

The Legislature should establish a statewide "life over property" policy for marina evacuations.

Comments:

a. This statute should prohibit marinas from having rules that require boats to be evacuated from marinas once a hurricane warning is in place. Special insurance programs and immunity provisions should be created to mitigate the effect of this prohibition on marina owners.

b. Marinas should have the authority to dictate the kind of cleats, ropes, fenders and other measures that must be used on boats in their marinas to minimize damage.

Recommendation # 21:

The Florida Department of Transportation should adopt a rule establishing procedures for determining when drawbridges should be locked down. The rule should be promulgated in coordination with state and county emergency management agencies and the U.S. Coast Guard. The rule should be in place and advertised to boat owners by June 1, 1993.

Comments:

a. Since the U.S. Coast Guard has jurisdiction over the operation of drawbridges and there is currently federal law dealing with this issue, it should be included in a coordinated effort to develop a statewide plan that has enough flexibility to consider the speed of an approaching storm and other appropriate factors.

b. Educational efforts directed at boat owners should be increased prior to the hurricane season to clearly communicate to boat owners when bridges will be locked down during an evacuation. This could consist of a pamphlet distributed with boat licenses.

c. When a hurricane is imminent, the Weather Channel, CNN, and the mass media should be used to convey information to boat owners concerning the status of bridges.
III. SHELTER

Florida has an inadequate supply of public shelter spaces. Before Hurricane Andrew, regional shelter studies determined that Florida had a statewide deficit of 118,000 shelter spaces.\(^2\) The actual shelter deficit may now be considerably higher because it is anticipated that more people than previously predicted will evacuate before the next hurricane because of increased public sensitivity to the danger posed by hurricanes generated by the severity of Hurricane Andrew.

While Florida's public shelter deficit cannot be immediately alleviated, an aggressive, multifaceted program should be begun to increase public shelter capacity in Florida. Such a program should be designed to eliminate Florida's public shelter deficit within five years.

**Issue A: Improve Shelter Planning and Operations**

**Recommendation # 22:**

The Department of Community Affairs should adopt a shelter element, which includes specific regional and interregional planning provisions, as part of the state comprehensive emergency management plan by March 1, 1994, and should amend Chapter 9G-7, Florida Administrative Code, to ensure that county shelter plans are coordinated with the revised state comprehensive emergency management plan.

Comments:

a. This element should be developed in consultation with county emergency management offices and the American Red Cross. The process should provide opportunities for full participation by the owners of shelter facilities.

b. The shelter element should be operations oriented. Many aspects of the shelter element should be automated and maintained on computer at the county and state level for use during emergency situations.

c. At a minimum, the shelter element of the statewide plan should:

\(^2\) This figure is arrived at by combining the deficit of 359,000 shelter spaces in five regions (Southwest Florida, South Florida, Tampa Bay, Northeast Florida, and Treasure Coast) with the 241,000 excess shelter spaces in six regions (Withlacoochee, North Central, Apalachee, East Central, Central Florida, and West Florida). [Source: Regional Hurricane Evacuation Studies. Department of Community Affairs. June 1992.]
These plans should provide specifically for predeployment of government personnel to shelters when a catastrophic disaster is imminent to supplement volunteer forces, especially to meet security and medical needs.

(1) contain or set forth strategies to obtain: (a) an inventory of all available shelter spaces, (b) an inventory of the supplies present at each shelter, especially emergency power generating equipment, and (c) an estimate of shelter demand in each county in response to minor, major, and catastrophic disasters;

(2) set forth strategies for alleviating shelter space deficits and shortfalls in shelter inventories;

(3) set forth policy guidance for local refuges of last resort programs;

(4) set forth a program for evaluating the structural soundness of additional non-school public shelters;

(5) provide for coordination with the American Red Cross, county sheriff and city police departments, Florida National Guard, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Department of Elder Affairs, the Agency for Health Care Administration, and county school districts to ensure that adequate staffing plans exist for all shelters, including medical and security personnel;

(6) be coordinated with regional and county shelter plans and studies;

(7) provide strategies to create: (a) a network of shelters paralleling the main highway evacuation routes, e.g., I-95, the Florida Turnpike, and (b) a system for moving evacuees off these routes into shelters when the storm approaches;

(8) provide for a post-disaster communications system for public shelters;

(9) establish model shelter guidelines for operations, registration, inventory, power generation capability, information management, and staffing; and

(10) set forth policy guidance for sheltering people with special needs. These policies should be developed in consultation with a task force that includes representatives of special needs populations and special needs service providers.

d. To assist counties and facilities with planning for sheltering persons with special needs, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the Department of Elder Affairs, the

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3 These plans should provide specifically for predeployment of government personnel to shelters when a catastrophic disaster is imminent to supplement volunteer forces, especially to meet security and medical needs.
Department of Labor and Employment Security, and the Agency for Health Care Administration should establish full-time special needs disaster assistance coordinators responsible for ensuring the needs of their special needs populations are addressed prior to, during, and after disasters. These positions should also coordinate the state agency review of facilities' evacuation and shelter plans.

e. The American Red Cross should work with the Department of Community Affairs and county emergency management agencies to systematically inventory the equipment and supplies available at each shelter location.

f. If necessary, the Legislature should establish a funding program administered by the Department of Community Affairs to properly equip shelters.

Issue B: Increase Use of Public Buildings

Recommendation #23:

The 1993 Legislature should amend appropriate sections of the Florida Statutes related to the construction of public schools, community colleges and universities, to require the State Board of Education and the Board of Regents to incorporate public shelter design criteria into the appropriate building codes by November 1, 1993.

Comments:

a. Public schools serve as a principle source of public shelters in Florida and more should be available for this purpose. Building codes for public schools, community colleges and universities do not include specific criteria to enhance their use as shelters.

b. Once added to the applicable building codes, the shelter design criteria should be part of the state's minimum criteria for school facilities. Only buildings specifically determined to not be necessary as a shelter location by the applicable County Emergency Management Office and the Department of Community Affairs should be able to be built without meeting shelter standards.

c. Public schools, community colleges and universities should be statutorily required to make facilities available as shelters. The new public shelter design criteria should be included in all new facilities that will serve as shelters that begin construction after January 1, 1995.

d. The public shelter design criteria should be developed by the Florida Department of Education and Board of Regents in conjunction with county school boards, county and state emergency management offices, and the American Red Cross.
Recommendation # 24:

The Florida Legislature should create a program to:

(a) Survey existing schools, universities, community colleges, and other state, municipal and county owned public buildings to identify those that are appropriately designed and located to serve as shelters. The owners of the facilities should participate in the surveys.

(b) Retrofit as necessary the selected facilities with hurricane shutters and other improvements, such as emergency power generation equipment adequate to fulfill the needs of the shelter. Funding for this program should be provided by the Legislature as it will benefit citizens statewide.

Comments:

a. The surveying program of schools, universities and community colleges should be undertaken by the Florida Department of Education and Board of Regents in conjunction with applicable entities, such as local school boards, community college boards, and the American Red Cross, and be completed within two years after the design criteria are established.

b. The survey of other public facilities should be coordinated by the Department of Community Affairs in conjunction with appropriate state agencies, the Florida League of Cities, and the Florida Association of Counties.

c. Retrofitting programs should be modeled on the Americans with Disabilities Act, which would give facilities specific time frames by which they would have to comply with retrofitting requirements.

d. All agencies should assess their buildings and complete any simple, inexpensive retrofits that it can accomplish before June 1, 1993.

e. Retrofitting facilities in regions with public shelter deficits should be given first priority and be completed within five years.

f. All appropriate facilities should be retrofitted within ten years.

g. State funds should be targeted to counties with shelter deficits.
Recommendation # 25:

The Department of Management Services should evaluate the feasibility and fiscal implications of constructing new state buildings to meet public shelter standards and report its findings to the Governor by November 1, 1993. The report should also address the fiscal implications of retrofitting existing state buildings to provide shelter capacity in counties with shelter deficits.

Comments:

a. The Department of Management Services should coordinate with state and county emergency management agencies and the American Red Cross during this study.

b. The study should be limited to existing and future buildings that would have potential to serve as shelters, such as those containing food preparation facilities. There are currently 45 large state office buildings that could meet these criteria.

c. The Department of Management Services estimates that it could meet this reporting date if adequate funding for the study is appropriated by the 1993 Legislature.

Issue C: Reduce Shelter Demand

Recommendation # 26:

The Department of Community Affairs should examine the appropriateness of amending Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, to require mobile home parks that are over a certain size and located outside of category 3 storm surge zones to incorporate on-site shelters built to shelter standards.

Comments:

a. Hurricane Andrew and other recent disasters in Pinellas County and the Southeastern United States have proven the vulnerability of mobile homes to very strong winds. The Committee supports improved structural standards for mobile homes but believes the desire for stronger structural requirements for mobile homes should be balanced against the need to preserve the availability of housing affordable to lower income households.

b. An acceptable alternative strategy could be to require mobile home parks to be built with adequate shelter space.
c. Before any recommendations pertaining to mobile homes are implemented, research should be undertaken to identify and minimize their fiscal impact on housing affordability.

d. The Department of Community Affairs should examine the fiscal impact of (1) requiring only new or expanding mobile home parks to include adequate shelter space and (2) also requiring existing parks to retrofit their clubhouses or other facilities to provide in-park shelter space.

e. The Department of Community Affairs, in conjunction with the Department of Business Regulation, should investigate the issue of whether the costs of provided shelters can be passed-through to lot owners.

Recommendation # 27:

The Department of Community Affairs should advocate the development and adoption of model building code requirements and incentives for new residential structures, both single-family and multistory, to address the issues of roof, weather envelope, and window and door failures, by the Legislature or the respective model code organizations. The Department of Community Affairs should specifically address requirements and incentives for shutters, improved roof connections, and creation of a safe shelter space within the living area available to each household.

Comments:

a. Florida should strongly promote in-place sheltering to avoid tragic loss of life from a hurricane catching motorists on highways while trying to evacuate unnecessarily. Building codes should be revised to increase the number of existing buildings in which individuals can safely remain during major and catastrophic hurricanes. In-place sheltering programs would have to be complemented by close-proximity shelter facilities.

b. One of the most difficult issues which must be dealt with is the need for requirements to limit window and door blow outs/ins and the need for requirements to assure the safety of occupants if windows and doors do blow out or in. A proper evaluation of these issues is needed to develop technically adequate and cost-sensitive recommendations.

c. If new residential structures were built with a "safe room," for example, a center bathroom or large closet, residents may more likely be able to safely stay home during hurricanes, as long as they do not live in the storm surge zone, low-lying area, or a mobile home.

d. Inclusion of shutters and stronger roof connections would have reduced the damage to many of the homes damaged by Andrew.
e. If new building code requirements are established, mechanisms for recognizing substantial equivalency should be put in place.

f. Code revisions should be coordinated with existing codes designed to meet other safety concerns.

**Recommendation # 28:**

The Agency for Health Care Administration should establish standards for facilities and equipment to ensure all residential care facilities are structurally capable of serving as shelters and equipped to be self-contained during disasters. The Florida Legislature should ensure that the Agency for Health Care Administration has adequate authority to require that new health or residential care facilities (hospitals, nursing homes, adult congregate living facilities and group homes) meet standards that will minimize the need for evacuations. Existing facilities should be retrofitted to meet the new standards.

**Comments:**

a. Standards for hospitals, nursing homes, adult congregate living facilities and group homes should be upgraded to reduce the need for hospital and nursing home evacuations. At a minimum, facilities in surge zones should be required to elevate essential equipment above anticipated surge levels.

b. These standards should include, but not be limited to window protection, window air conditioner straps, and internal stairways. The facility should have a plan for medical staffing, a communication system, and a 72-hour supply of emergency equipment, medical supplies, food and water to ensure the facility is self-contained during and after a disaster.

c. It is important to emphasize that this recommendation does not preclude residential care facilities from having to evacuate when ordered. The purpose of this recommendation is to provide additional protection to residential care facilities not required to evacuate, and to increase the probability that evacuated facilities would be available for re-occupancy after the disaster. The licensing of facilities could be the trigger to ensure buildings are structurally sound.

d. Funding for retrofitting of existing special needs facilities or constructing new facilities to meet this newly proposed standard could be provided through programs such as capital development loans, low-interest rate mortgages, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development funds, or Capital Expenditures Needs Certificates.
Issue D: Improve Registration of Shelter Occupants

Following major or catastrophic disasters, the Department of Community Affairs, local governments, and the American Red Cross are deluged with calls from people concerned about family members. The American Red Cross processed 9023 disaster welfare inquiries following Hurricane Andrew.

Recommendation # 29:

The American Red Cross should develop a computerized network system for registering shelter occupants that can be accessed by out-of-town residents inquiring about relatives.

Comments:

a. The American Red Cross is currently developing a computerized tracking system for its shelters.

b. Because of the need to focus on sheltering and feeding, the American Red Cross currently does not process "disaster welfare inquiries" during the first 48 hours post-disaster.

c. To minimize disruption of American Red Cross Chapters that are responding to a disaster, inquiries by out-of-town residents are answered by their local American Red Cross Chapter.

Issue E: Improve Sheltering of People with Special Needs

The health, safety and welfare of people with special needs must be ensured in a disaster. The testimony received by the Committee called for actions to ensure that disaster plans that address these populations are in place. These plans should consider individuals who reside in residential care facilities and individuals who live independently in the community. Counties should ensure the coordination of disaster plans for people with special needs at the community and regional levels.

Recommendation # 30:

The Legislature should amend Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, to better define "people with special needs."

Comments:

a. The term "people with special needs" has traditionally referred to people who need assistance to evacuate and includes the elderly, frail, disabled, homebound, and otherwise functionally
limited population. A task force consisting of appropriate special needs agencies should be created to develop this definition.

b. Functional limitations in the activities of daily living should be the basis to define people with special needs. Special needs population should not be defined in terms of disability; the term "disability" can lend itself to some subjective interpretations. It is the general perception that individuals living in residential care facilities are to some extent defined by the type of facility they are in and the type of care they receive.

c. It is important to differentiate between people with special needs who live independently in the community and people who live in a residential care facility (such as a nursing home, adult congregate living facility or group home). In addition, this definition should consider the different levels of functional limitations and address the fact that additional individuals will develop special needs as a result of a disaster.

d. Other related terms which need to be agreed upon and defined include: service provider (referring to any agency that has contact with the subject population), special needs unit or special care unit (shelter for people with special needs), and host facility (shelter for resident care facilities that are evacuated).

Recommendation # 31:

The 1993 Legislature should amend appropriate statutes to define "residential care facilities" that should be responsible for maintaining evacuation and shelter plans.

Comments:

a. This definition should include any congregate living environment which houses five or more non-related people with special needs living together under the supervision of someone paid for their care. At a minimum, this definition should include hospitals, nursing homes, adult congregate living facilities, and group homes.

b. Residential care facilities provide care for their clients on a full-time basis. Therefore, these facilities should also be responsible for providing care in a disaster, including, at a minimum, adequate food and water, medical supplies, emergency power, and staffing. During an evacuation the facilities should have all essentials available to care for the residents. Adequate strengthening of the facilities can allow the facility to resume functioning more quickly after evacuation orders are lifted.

c. There are many different types of residential care facilities. The licensing requirements of each type vary under Florida Statutes. This results in a lack of comprehensive disaster planning for these facilities. For instance, nursing homes, hospitals and adult congregate living facilities are
required to have a disaster plan, whereas group homes are not. By defining residential care facilities as recommended, disaster planning requirements would be uniformly applicable to facilities that provide care to people with special needs.

Recommendation #32:

The 1993 Legislature should amend appropriate statutes and the Agency for Health Care Administration should amend Rule 59A-4, Florida Administrative Code, to include minimum criteria for the development and maintenance of disaster plans by hospitals, nursing homes, adult congregate living facilities, and group homes and for joint state-county review and approval of the plans.

Comments:

a. Hospitals, nursing homes, adult congregate living facilities, and group homes must prepare and maintain disaster plans as a condition of their licenses and these plans are reviewed annually by the Agency for Health Care Administration. Although these activities are required by statute and rule, the regulations are silent on minimum criteria for the preparation and review of the plans. This has resulted in a lack of consistent quality in the plans and lack of a coordinated review of the plans. Minimum criteria and joint state-county oversight are needed to ensure that the cumulative effects of the disaster plans are being evaluated.

b. At a minimum, these plans should address: evacuation transportation, post-disaster transportation, medical supplies, medical staffing, emergency equipment, emergency power, food and water, individual identification of patients, responding to family inquiries, transfer of medical records and mutual aid agreements with host facilities. The county emergency management agency, the Department of Elder Affairs, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and the Agency for Health Care Administration should provide technical assistance in the development of disaster plans. The absence of an adequate plan or the failure to carry out the plan in a disaster should result in the imposition of penalties, up to and including loss of license.

c. A joint state-county review and approval process for evaluating disaster plans prepared by such should be established. This process should incorporate a coordinated review by county emergency management agencies, the Department of Elder Affairs, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the Agency for Health Care Administration, the American Red Cross and other appropriate agencies. Appropriate funding should be provided to these agencies to carry out these duties.
Recommendation # 33:

The Agency for Health Care Administration should amend Rule 59A-4.126(2)(g), Florida Administrative Code, to clarify that nursing homes may not use public shelters as alternative host facilities.

Comments:

a. Rule 59A-4.126(2), Florida Administrative Code, requires nursing homes to maintain written agreements with alternative host facilities. It also requires procedures for necessary personnel to accompany residents to auxiliary facilities -- such as schools, American Red Cross centers or other evacuation centers -- thus providing a loophole for nursing homes to evacuate their residents to public shelters.

Recommendation # 34:

Coordinate and strengthen the registration of people with special needs by requiring appropriate agencies and community-based service providers, including home health care providers, to collect registration information for people with special needs as part of program intake processes, establish programs to increase the awareness of the registration process, and educate clients about the implications of their functional limitations in disasters.

Comments:

a. Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, requires county emergency management agencies to provide for the voluntary registration of residents within their jurisdiction who would need assistance in order to evacuate. Because registration is voluntary and not widely publicized, registration is lower than the anticipated number of people in the population who would need special assistance. Individuals with special needs living in the community need to be specifically targeted for special outreach and educational efforts so they will voluntarily register. The expansion of the registration and management of the people with special needs program should be an ongoing, long-term process. The confidential nature of the special needs registry should be emphasized.

b. The county emergency management agency, along with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the Department of Elder Affairs, and the American Red Cross, and other Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters agencies, should coordinate public awareness and education efforts at a countywide level and provide support to the community-based service providers. The service providers should periodically report to the county emergency management agency and other appropriate agencies about their registration efforts. The registration data should be assembled into a countywide database coded geographically and
providing health classification information. To facilitate the coordination of the registration process, a standard registration form should be developed for use statewide.

c. There is a need for greater public knowledge of the registration process to ensure the inclusion of all special needs individuals who live in the community. Community-based service providers have direct contact with special needs individuals living in the community and have earned the trust of these individuals. Therefore, service providers are in a better position to inform and educate special needs individuals. The Departments of Community Affairs, Elder Affairs, and Health and Rehabilitative Services are best equipped to provide overall coordination and support.

Recommendation # 35:

The 1993 Legislature should amend Section 252.355, Florida Statutes, to require clients of state or federally funded service programs to register as people with special needs.

Comments:

a. Currently, there is a lack of participation with voluntary registration. Many special needs individuals who require assistance during evacuation are not being adequately identified and served. State and federally funded service providers should initiate mandatory registration as part of the intake process to assistance programs.

b. Registration information should be gathered by service agency personnel and fed into county and state registries. In the event a county registry is not operable due to a disaster, the state registry would be the backup. State funds should be appropriated for this effort.

c. By use of the phrase "clients of state or federally funded service programs" the Committee only means to include people with physical or mental handicaps that require them to need assistance in evacuating or when in shelters. This Committee is not referring to persons receiving economic assistance such as welfare or food stamp recipients.

Recommendation # 36:

The 1993 Legislature should amend appropriate sections of the Florida Statutes to authorize the Medicaid Program to reimburse hospitals for skilled nursing beds being used for other than acute care because of reasons pertaining to a Disaster Declaration issued by the Governor or the President.
Comments:

a. Prior to Hurricane Andrew's landfall in south Florida, many nursing homes evacuated to area hospitals. Currently, there are limited provisions for hospitals to be paid by the Medicaid Program for beds being used for other than acute care. By granting the use of "swing beds" during a declared state of emergency or disaster, hospitals can be reimbursed for both acute care and nursing care, which would assist hospitals in their care for other types of patients.

b. The Florida Hospital Association reported that the Agency for Health Care Administration established similar provisions by emergency rule.
CHAPTER TWO: AFTER THE STORM

The Committee found that post-disaster response and recovery efforts following Hurricane Andrew were (and are) laudable, especially given the magnitude of the storm. Nevertheless, this experience revealed that the State of Florida, its local governments, major volunteer organizations, and the government of the United States are not fully prepared to respond to catastrophic disasters.

The Committee examined many facets of the response and recovery effort following Hurricane Andrew's landfall. The Committee focused on the post-disaster response and recovery effort during the first two weeks after Andrew's landfall. The following issues were investigated by the Committee:

- post-disaster communications and public information;
- post-disaster response and recovery operations, including intergovernmental coordination, chain of command, and security;
- availability of damage assessment data;
- environmental clean-up and debris removal;
- provision of medical care and relief;
- provision of temporary housing;
- coordination of supplies, volunteers and donations; and
- restoration of electrical power and telephone service.

The recommendations of the Committee follow below. They address post-disaster communications and public information; post-disaster response and recovery operations; availability of damage assessment data; medical care and relief; and coordination of volunteers, donations and supplies.

One issue must be emphasized. Although the following recommendations will improve post-disaster response and recovery efforts following future disasters, the recommended actions must be implemented before the next disaster to have any effect.

I. POST-DISASTER COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

After a catastrophic disaster like Hurricane Andrew, normal means of communications in the affected areas will be either demolished or largely incapacitated. The ability of emergency management forces to effectively coordinate hurricane post-disaster response and recovery activities depends upon their ability to communicate. This requires a network of reliable and redundant communications systems and a capability to rapidly establish temporary communications immediately after the storm.

In addition to effective communications among governmental and non-governmental emergency personnel, state and local officials must have in place effective means for communicating information
and instructions to the public. State and local officials rely on written media releases and periodic media briefings to pass information to the public.

Hurricane Andrew demonstrated the need to re-evaluate the equipment and systems used to communicate during disasters and to improve procedures for acquisition and deployment of additional communications equipment, establishment of temporary communications, and means for communicating information and instructions to the public.

**Issue A: Coordination of Emergency Communications**

**Recommendation # 37:**

An Emergency Support Function (ESF) for Communications should be established at the state emergency operations center to implement the post-disaster communications plan and assure the provision of adequate telecommunications support to emergency post-disaster response and recovery efforts.

Comments:

a. The establishment of a Communications ESF will assure better coordination of actions by state and federal agencies to provide telecommunications support during a hurricane. The Department of Management Services' Division of Communications should serve as the primary agency, with other state agencies with significant communications capabilities and resources serving as support agencies, e.g., the Division of Forestry, Florida National Guard.

b. The Communications ESF should be responsible for:

   (1) identifying operational communications facilities within the affected area(s) that are available for use;

   (2) identifying those communications facilities outside the affected area(s) that can be made available for use in the affected area(s);

   (3) identifying actions by commercial telecommunications companies to recover and restore their facilities; and

   (4) coordinating the deployment and use of telecommunications equipment and resources to support post-disaster response and recovery efforts.

c. Those agencies represented on the Communications ESF should inventory all available telecommunications resources for use during a hurricane.
d. For the Communications ESF to be effective, there must be an inventory of all existing government-furnished communications, commercially leased communications, and telecommunications services available under the provisions of the national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications service priority system procedures for expediting service requirements. This inventory should include, but not be limited to:

(1) mobile or transportable telecommunications equipment;

(2) multichannel radio systems;

(3) base stations and hand-held portable radios;

(4) mobile or transportable microwave systems;

(5) mobile satellite systems;

(6) mobile or transportable switchboards and station equipment;

(7) aircraft/watercraft suitable as platforms for radio repeaters; and

(8) trained installation and operations personnel available for deployment into affected area(s).

e. Once this inventory has been completed, the Division of Communications should determine the extent to which existing telecommunications equipment and resources are compatible with each other.

f. During Hurricane Andrew, a variety of communications resources were made available in the disaster area from federal, state, local and private entities. Problems resulted from the lack of common channels and frequencies. Every effort should be made to ensure that additional communications equipment deployed within the affected area(s) is compatible with other equipment.

**Recommendation #38:**

The Department of Management Services should coordinate the preparation of an emergency communications coordination plan as a part of the statewide communications plan to guide the use of telecommunications equipment by emergency personnel.
Comments:

a. The Emergency Communications Coordination Plan should be prepared in conjunction with the Department of Community Affairs and agencies that will have responsibility under ESF # 2 (Communications).

b. The Emergency Communications Coordination Plan should address the use of standardized equipment and common frequencies; the hardening of existing and new facilities to mitigate future damage from storms; the use of broadcast media transmissions capabilities as a backup for communicating with response agencies; and requirements for periodic exercises to test the plan; and should consider the use of new technologies, e.g., low earth orbit satellite systems, personal communications services.

c. The plan should be developed to be compatible with any pertinent federal communications plan.

Issue B: Coordination of Post-Disaster Emergency Communications

Recommendation # 39:

The Department of Management Services should revise state emergency plans and implementing procedures to provide for the predeployment and staging of equipment, personnel and resources necessary to establish temporary telecommunications capabilities.

Comments:

a. Prior to the landfall of Hurricane Andrew, the Department of Community Affairs predeployed its two mobile communications vans in the Orlando area. This was outside the radius of tropical storm strength winds but close enough to allow rapid deployment into the affected area. Within a few hours after landfall, the vans were located and operational at the Metro-Dade emergency operations center and at the Homestead City Hall. Metro-Dade County and Homestead provided antennae, phone lines, and electricity. All emergency operation centers should have external outlets to support such vehicles.

b. There are other resources that, although not predeployed during Hurricane Andrew, could be predeployed as a matter of procedure. This includes communications assets from the Florida National Guard that have the capability for rapid deployment and field installation of land-mobile, two-way radio, point-to-point radio (high frequency through microwave), and wireline systems to satisfy a wide range of communications needs. The Florida Wing of the Civil Air Patrol has more than 500 very high frequency (VHF) mobile radios. More than half of these have a range of 10-15 miles, and can be used during a hurricane.  
Recommendation # 40:

The National Warning System should be used as the primary means for communicating with county emergency management agencies outside of the affected area(s).

Comments:

a. After landfall it is important to maintain communications with local emergency management agencies outside of the disaster area(s). Because of its "conference call" capability, the National Warning System should be used as the primary means to coordinate the exchange of information with counties located outside of the disaster area(s).

Recommendation # 41:

The Department of Management Services, in conjunction with the Department of Community Affairs, should establish open purchase orders and memoranda of understanding with commercial telecommunications companies to provide temporary communications equipment within the disaster area(s).

Comments:

a. In order to meet the immediate demand for equipment necessary to establish temporary communications within the disaster area(s), two options appear feasible. The first option is to purchase and store large numbers of hand-held radios and cellular phones that could then quickly be deployed to emergency personnel. This option is not recommended. The second and preferred option is to establish open purchase orders and memoranda of agreement with commercial telecommunications companies to lease the necessary equipment and services.

b. Several factors must be considered relative to the first option -- large-scale purchase and storage of communications equipment by the state. First, it is doubtful that sufficient state funding could be secured to purchase the requisite number of hand-held radios and other necessary equipment. Second, sufficient storage space must be located. Third, the equipment must be periodically inspected, tested and repaired to ensure its operability when needed. Finally, the "state of the art" improves so quickly that equipment purchased by the state will soon become obsolete.

c. The preferred option is to establish open purchase orders and memoranda of agreement with commercial telecommunications companies to lease the necessary equipment and services. The memoranda of agreement should identify the number and types of equipment to be provided, timeframes for providing the equipment, contact persons, and programming requirements. Equipment to be provided under these memoranda of agreement should include, at a minimum,
preprogrammed hand-held portable radios, cellular phones, and switches. Services, such as the provision of satellite uplink and downlink time, should also be included.

**Recommendation # 42:**

The Department of Community Affairs should make necessary arrangements with counties and cities that have mobile emergency communications vans to use the vans and trained operators in an emergency if they are not supporting local operations.

**Comments:**

a. It was apparent during Hurricane Andrew that the two emergency communications vans owned by the Division of Emergency Management cannot provide sufficient coverage of a large disaster area. Many county emergency management agencies have communications vans similar to those owned by the Division of Emergency Management. These vans can be pre-deployed near the disaster area(s), assigned common radio frequencies to assure compatibility with other post-disaster response efforts, and strategically located throughout the disaster area(s) to serve as radio relays for emergency personnel. As communications are restored, the vans could be reassigned to support emergency operations elsewhere or released.

**Recommendation # 43:**

The Departments of Management Services and Community Affairs should coordinate to have the 800 Megahertz (MHz) radio communications system expanded to include channels for emergency management. The two emergency communications vans owned by the Department of Community Affairs should be upgraded with the installation of 800 MHz transceivers, extendable towers and antennas, and additional hand-held portable 800 MHz radios.

**Comments:**

a. The 800 MHz radio band contains a number of unused channels that could be made available for use for emergency management purposes. The establishment of an 800 MHz system for emergency management includes both long-term and short-term strategies.

b. In the short term, six mutual aid channels presently exist within the 800 MHz band. Five of these channels are set aside nationwide for use by state and local public safety and emergency management agencies. The sixth channel is similar in function but is available for use only in Florida under licenses held by the Division of Communications. Because these channels are shared, their effective use during an emergency may require cooperative agreements with other state and local agencies that use them.
c. In the long term, the state should apply to the Florida Region Committee (which is made up of state and local public safety officials) during the 1993 filing window for four conventional channels for emergency management purposes. Depending on their availability, these channels could then be allotted on a statewide basis or in groups on a regional basis. These channels should be dedicated to emergency management communications for use in establishing networks linking post-disaster response and recovery sites and facilities.

d. Since these channels will be a primary means of interagency communications in areas where 800 MHz is in use, the capability to establish temporary repeater sites for all channels must exist. 800 MHz base stations with repeaters programmed to the mutual aid channels (and eventually to the dedicated emergency management channels) and a 100’ extendable tower should be purchased and installed in each of the two emergency communications vans owned by the Department of Community Affairs' Division of Emergency Management. This will allow the vans to function as temporary repeater sites until permanent communications have been restored. A small number of hand-held 800 MHz radios (100-200) programmed to the mutual aid channels (and eventually to the dedicated emergency management channels) should be purchased and placed in the vans for use in the field. These radios should be supported by additional radios made available through open purchase orders and memoranda of agreement.

Recommendation # 44:

The cellular telephone industry is urged to work to accelerate technological improvements so that priorities can be established for the use of cellular telephones during early post-disaster periods.

Comments:

a. The use of cellular telephones created a number of problems after Hurricane Andrew. Many of the cell sites were damaged or destroyed. Many of those remaining failed from the lack of commercial power to the cell site batteries immediately following landfall.

b. Although Cellular One and BellSouth Mobility both restored their pre-existing service capacity in the impacted area within four days, the channels became so jammed with calls that the system could not be used as anticipated. This problem could be addressed by establishing priorities for use of cellular phones, restricting their use to emergency traffic until regular systems are restored.

c. The Committee received testimony from BellSouth Mobility and Cellular One that indicated current technology will not allow for prioritization of individual phones, although certain channels could be reserved. As the cellular industry moves to digital technology over the next three years, the ability to prioritize individual phones or groups of phones should become available.
d. When technically possible, priority should be given to cellular phone users as follows:

(1) state and local public safety units, e.g., emergency management, fire, emergency medical services; state, local and federal law enforcement personnel; Florida National Guard and federal military personnel; state, local and federal human services units, e.g., American Red Cross, public health units, and other medical personnel; and public utilities designated to restore service and/or take corrective actions;

(2) the media and selected fiscal and economic interests, e.g., banks, investment firms; and

(3) the general public.

Recommendation # 45:

The Legislature should appropriate funds to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for the purchase of two additional vehicles: a Florida security control center vehicle, and an emergency communications and command center vehicle. Existence of these vehicles would greatly improve the state's capability to coordinate post-disaster response and recovery activities and emergency communications within the disaster area.

Comments:

a. These technologically-advanced vehicles should be utilized throughout the state for deployment and rapid response to any man-made or natural disaster. These vehicles would provide the necessary capability to rapidly employ critical emergency communications within the disaster area.

b. The Florida Security Control Center Vehicle should serve as the primary field communications and coordination center for state and local law enforcement agencies. The vehicle should be designed on a hydraulic expandable trailer and include a double expandable conference room, generators, and necessary communications equipment.

c. The Florida Emergency Communications and Command Center Vehicle would provide for self-contained, compatible communications among local, state and federal agencies. The vehicle should include a totally integrated communications network, a double expandable conference room, and generators to operate in the field.

d. Procedures for use of these vehicles should specify how emergency power will be supplied and how emergency fueling will be handled.

Recommendation # 46:
County emergency management plans and procedures should be revised as necessary to identify an amateur radio coordinator and to encourage the use of amateur radio operators at shelters and post-disaster response sites and facilities.

Comments:

a. The contributions of volunteer amateur radio operators during Hurricane Andrew should not be overlooked. These volunteer operators have their own equipment and are available to quickly establish communications at public shelters, distribution sites, and reception and staging areas. Effective use of amateur radio operators can help relieve the burden on governmental agencies to establish temporary emergency communications. The American Red Cross and ham radio operator groups have agreements regarding shelter communications.

b. Plans should be made to develop, support, and recognize the contributions of amateur radio operators to encourage more recruits to counteract the significant decline in the number of young people getting involved in amateur radio activities.

Issue C: Coordinating the Release of Information and Instructions to the Public

Recommendation # 47:

The Department of Community Affairs should work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, counties, voluntary organizations and the media to develop procedures that will ensure consistent and coordinated release of post-disaster information to the media and public.

Comments:

a. Standardized formats and procedures should be used for releasing information to the public and media. For example, an "Immediate Broadcast Emergency Bulletin" could be issued in those instances where immediate action is necessary to save lives or safeguard the public. An "Emergency Information Update" could be released according to an established schedule, e.g., every two hours.

b. The formats for state and local bulletins should be identical and should include a complete overview of necessary emergency information, i.e., evacuation status, and road and school closings. County releases should be shared with the state and vice-versa.

c. Following major or catastrophic disasters, a single point or a small number of points of release should be established for coordinating the release of information to the media in order to avoid release of duplicating or conflicting information. This can be most easily accomplished through
co-location of public information officers in the joint information center that the Federal Emergency Management Agency will establish in or near the disaster field office. The joint information center should serve as the physical location where federal, state and county public information officers come together to ensure coordination of information released to the media and public. The purpose of the joint information center is to serve as the central point for media access to the latest developments and emergency information. Potential joint information center sites should be identified in advance in county and state post-disaster response and recovery plans.

d. At somewhat greater cost, facilities to be used as joint information centers could be predesignated, hardened and wired in each of the 10 regional media markets. In media regions with more than one large county, more than one facility should be prepared. These buildings should be large enough to accommodate the media and local, state and federal information personnel after the storm. Multiple paths for data and information transfer that are hardened so that they will survive the storm, i.e., buried underground, should be established between these buildings and the emergency operations centers in the media market. In the case of more than one facility, hardened communication paths should also be established between them. In addition, local media should be encouraged to install hardened paths (primary and back-up) for video and data capabilities.

e. The state's emergency communications coordination plan should contain procedures for coordinating releases of information to the media and the public during the time from the impact of the disaster until the joint information center is fully operational.

Recommendation # 48:

**Counties should identify facilities or areas where emergency supplies and information would be first available after major and catastrophic disasters in their post-disaster response and recovery plans.**

Comments:

A. Certain facilities should be designated as post-disaster information centers so people would automatically know where to go to get help and information, i.e., schools, shopping centers.

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4 According to the Florida Association of Broadcasters, Florida is made up of the following 10 media markets: Pensacola, Panama City, Tallahassee, Jacksonville, Tampa Bay, Gainesville/Ocala, Orlando, West Palm Beach, Miami/Ft. Lauderdale, and Ft. Myers/Naples.

5 Perhaps 14 facilities would be needed: one per media market plus one additional facility in each of four media markets: Miami/Ft. Lauderdale, Tampa Bay, Gainesville/Ocala, and Ft. Myers/Naples.
The location of these facilities should be listed and identified on a map in the telephone directory. Permanent signs should be placed at these facilities to indicate their purpose. County plans should call for county emergency personnel to go to these locations at the first opportunity after the storm.

**Recommendation # 49:**

*Local media should provide their technical and programming plans for the release of emergency information to the public to applicable county emergency management agencies to help emergency management personnel to be familiar with media procedures.*

**Comments:**

a. If they are more familiar with media plans for the release of emergency information to the public, local emergency management directors can better integrate their emergency plans with those of the local media.

**Recommendation # 50:**

*The Department of Community Affairs should coordinate the development of a system for disseminating post-disaster information and instructions to the public using non-electronic media and methods.*

a. Because of the likely disruption to electrical power and telecommunications systems, state and local emergency management officials should agree upon non-electronic methods for disseminating information and instructions to the public. This system should be adopted for statewide use, e.g., a red helium balloon should mean the same thing in any county. Communication media to be considered should include, but not be limited to:

1. Helium-filled balloons to mark areas where services and information are available;
2. Distribution of multilingual newsletters advising the public of the availability of services;
3. Multilingual broadcast vehicles with loud speakers; and
4. Airships/blimps with electronic billboard capabilities.

**II. POST-DISASTER RESPONSE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS**

The following section addresses one of the most controversial and critical aspects of emergency preparedness: post-disaster response and recovery operations. The Committee benefitted from a
voluminous quantity of oral and written testimony on this issue. Much of this testimony emphasized three key points:

(1) the chain of command must be clear and understood, especially within and among federal and state agencies, water management districts, counties, cities, and volunteer organizations;

(2) the roles and responsibilities of individuals and organizations must be clearly delineated; and

(3) individuals and organizations expected to perform roles and fulfill responsibilities in post-disaster response and recovery efforts must be trained to carry them out.

The following sections contain many recommendations to enhance post-disaster response and recovery operations. The Committee recognizes that transforming these recommendations into meaningful plans and programs will not be easy but challenges all applicable agencies to make the necessary effort to be ready for the next hurricane season. The implementation effort should give special attention to the three points noted above.

**Issue A: Improve Planning for Post-Disaster Response and Recovery**

**Recommendation # 51:**

The State of Florida and counties should use three categories of disasters -- minor, major, and catastrophic -- in emergency preparedness and recovery planning.

Comments:

a. This issue is discussed in the introduction to this report.

b. County emergency management agencies should declare when a minor disaster has occurred. The Governor should make the determination when a disaster is major or catastrophic.

**Recommendation # 52:**

The Department of Community Affairs should adopt a post-disaster response and recovery element, which includes specific regional and interregional planning provisions, as part of the state comprehensive emergency management plan by June 1, 1993. This element should provide for a state post-disaster response and recovery strategy generally aligned with the strategy used by the federal government. Each Florida state agency assigned lead responsibility for an emergency support function by the state comprehensive emergency plan should prepare a detailed operational plan needed to implement the ESF assigned by June 1,
1993. The 1993 Legislature should amend Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, to add these requirements.

Comments:

a. Florida's state policy for responding to disasters should be to support local efforts. In the case of major or catastrophic disasters, however, the needs of citizens and communities will likely be greater than local resources. In these situations, the state must be capable of providing effective, coordinated, and timely support to communities and the public. A key to creating this state capability is the creation of a post-disaster response and recovery element in the state comprehensive emergency management plan.

b. The Department of Community Affairs and the Florida Emergency Preparedness Association are both in the process of preparing state recovery plans. These draft documents should be evaluated for use in preparing this post-disaster response and recovery element.

c. To improve coordination between the state and federal governments during the post-disaster response and recovery period, Florida's post-disaster response and recovery team should be based on a command and control structure that generally parallels the organization set forth in the Federal Response Plan.

d. The post-disaster response and recovery element should predesignate specific entities that would assume control of 12 separate emergency support functions (ESFs). These ESFs should address the following areas:

(#1) transportation;
(#2) communications;
(#3) public works and engineering;
The Federal Response Plan does not combine these functions but instead calls for two separate ESFs, #4 firefighting and #9 urban search and rescue. It is recommended that Florida combine these functions into one ESF because it will better correspond to the organization most counties will use to carry out these activities.

In the Federal Response Plan, security is not designated as an ESF. In their case, a Defense Coordinating Officer who reports directly to the Federal Coordinating Officer coordinates activities of the Department of Defense. No individual is assigned responsibility to coordinate all federal law enforcement operations (see also recommendation #81).
i. The Department of Community Affairs should work closely with Florida's local governments and those agencies with post-disaster response and recovery responsibilities in creating the element. It should provide for different post-disaster response and recovery scenarios depending on whether the disaster is minor, major, or catastrophic.

j. The element should be updated annually, although many of its provisions, especially resource inventories, should be kept on computer and updated continuously.

k. In addition to establishing the organizational structure of Florida's post-disaster response and recovery team as described above, the element should provide for:

(1) a description of Florida's post-disaster response and recovery strategy, including the organization of the post-disaster response and recovery team, procedures for activating the state's plan, policies used to guide post-disaster response and recovery activities, delineation of the chain of command, description of initial and continuous post-disaster response and recovery actions, and establishment of agency responsibilities;

(2) a continuous training program for the individuals (and their alternates) who will be called on to perform key roles in state and local post-disaster response and recovery efforts;

(3) detailed training manuals and operational guidelines for each position in Florida's post-disaster response and recovery team;

(4) periodic, e.g., annual, exercises for responding to minor, major, and catastrophic disasters;

(5) current inventories of equipment and supplies available under pre-established memoranda of agreement;

(6) identification of potential disaster field office sites statewide;

(7) a pre-established statewide staging area network, perhaps using existing fairgrounds, and identification of the agencies designated to use the staging areas;

(8) procedures and measures for logistical and finance/administrative support;

(9) a comprehensive communications plan;

(10) an inventory of active mutual aid agreements, strategies for liaison with the associations that administer the agreements, and procedures for monitoring aid provided to jurisdictions under the agreements;
(11) a comprehensive statewide medical care and relief plan coordinated with the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the Agency for Health Care Administration, the Department of Labor and Employment Security, the Department of Elder Affairs, and the U.S. Public Health Service;

(12) systems for coordinating volunteers and accepting and distributing donated funds and goods, including access to a predesignated large-scale toll free phone bank;

(13) current and detailed instructions for dealing with the federal government, including protocol for requests for equipment, supplies, and nonmilitary and military assistance, and guidelines for maintaining financial records to obtain prompt assistance and reimbursements; and

(14) in the case of an imminent major disaster, procedures for predeployment of the Florida National Guard, and, in the case of an imminent catastrophic disaster, procedures for predeployment of the Florida National Guard and the U.S. Armed Forces.

l. If Florida enters into an interstate compact, the post-disaster response and recovery plan should be amended to include procedures for responding to disasters in other states.

m. The effectiveness of state and federal officials trying to assist local governments following a major or catastrophic disaster would be enhanced by an understanding of the political situation in each county. To assist individuals to acquire this information, the Department of Community Affairs should maintain a current snapshot of the political situation in each county, including county-city relationships, e.g. charter or noncharter county, and a directory of key elected and administrative officials.

Recommendation # 53:

The 1993 Legislature should amend Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, and other statutes as necessary, to provide each state agency with lead responsibility for an emergency support function with authority to promulgate rules necessary to carry out its responsibilities under the ESF.
Comments:

a. For example, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has said it needs authority to promulgate rules to establish state management support units and state management support regions to support the overall coordination of emergency medical facilities to a declared state disaster.

Recommendation # 54:

The 1993 Legislature should amend Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, to require all counties to adopt post-disaster response and recovery elements. Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, should clearly require cities’ emergency planning efforts to be consistent with and subject to the applicable county plans. The Department of Community Affairs should amend Rule 9G-7, Florida Administrative Code, to establish the minimum criteria for county post-disaster response and recovery elements.

Comments:

a. Every county in Florida should have a post-disaster response and recovery element as part of its peacetime emergency plan. The post-disaster response and recovery element should be created in coordination with the cities in the county and in coordination with adjacent counties, regional and state post-disaster response and recovery agencies, and associations administering mutual aid agreements to which the county or its cities are a party.

b. Cities have the option of conducting their own emergency preparedness planning pursuant to Chapter 252, Florida Statutes. Cities' plans should be consistent with and subject to the applicable county plan. If cities elect not to prepare their own emergency management plans, counties should retain responsibility for planning for these cities, as they now are under Chapter 252, Florida Statutes. Counties should periodically review municipal plans to ensure their consistency with the county plan.

c. The Department of Community Affairs should adopt criteria by rule to require that these elements, at a minimum, provide for:

(1) a post-disaster response and recovery command and control system that reflects the state's approach or is based on related Incident Command System principles\(^8\);

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\(^8\) The Incident Command System concept is a management structure used to coordinate responses to disasters. The organizational structure used in Incident Command Systems has five major functions: command, planning, operations, logistics, and finance. The number of personnel involved in each of
(2) a description of the county's post-disaster response and recovery strategy, including the
organization of the post-disaster response and recovery team, procedures for activating
the county's plan, policies used to guide post-disaster response and recovery activities,
delineation of the chain of command, description of initial and continuous post-disaster
response and recovery actions, and establishment of agency responsibilities;

(3) a recurring training program for the individuals (and their alternates) who will be called
on to perform key roles in local post-disaster response and recovery efforts;

(4) detailed training manuals and operational guidelines for each position in the county's
post-disaster response and recovery team;

(5) an inventory of potential preselected sites for co-locating food and water distribution
centers, temporary medical care facilities, public information centers, public assistance
centers, and other key post-disaster response and recovery facilities;

(6) an inventory of potential disaster field office facilities, regional supply operation staging
areas, and military staging areas;

(7) provisions for both meeting the needs of families of post-disaster response and
recovery personnel and for ensuring that stress, fatigue, and family concerns among
personnel do not hinder post-disaster response and recovery operations;

(8) a current inventory of equipment and supplies, e.g., back hoes, portable toilets, and
related maintenance agreements available under pre-established memoranda of
agreement;

(9) a current inventory of assistance available through mutual aid agreements and a method
for advising state emergency management personnel or mutual aid agreement
administrators of assistance received thereunder;

(10) coordination among the cities in the county and the county during the post-disaster
response and recovery period;

these functions expands or contracts based on the type and magnitude of disaster. A designated
Incident Commander has overall responsibility for the disaster and authority over all five functions. The
Incident Command System concept has been used most frequently in efforts to fight large fires but there
is growing recognition of its potential for managing responses to other major disasters, especially at the
local jurisdiction and subjurisdiction level.
(11) periodic, e.g., annual, exercises for responding to minor, major, and catastrophic disasters;

(12) procedures and measures for logistical and finance/administrative support;

(13) a comprehensive communications plan;

(14) a plan for debris removal, including provisions to chip and mulch vegetative debris instead of burning, and quick, sanitary handling of deceased animals;

(15) procedures for coordinating volunteers and accepting and distributing donated funds and goods; and

(16) procedures for predicting in advance needs for food, water, and other supplies by zone in impacted areas.

Recommendation # 55:

Florida's counties should serve as liaison for and coordinator of cities' requests for state and federal assistance during post-disaster emergency operations. Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, should require cities to coordinate requests for state or federal emergency response assistance with their county. This does not apply to requests for reimbursement under federal public disaster assistance programs.

Comments:

a. Effective post-disaster response and recovery operations require a clear chain of command and commitment to working together within an agreed upon system. The proper allocation of state and federal resources in a county also depends on knowing the big picture concerning needs throughout a county and cities within the county. This information can only be generated if cities within a county and the county are working together in a partnership in the post-disaster response and recovery phase.

b. Assistance provided to cities through mutual aid agreements would not need to be coordinated through county emergency operations centers but cities should advise county decision makers concerning the assistance that they are receiving.

c. When the impacted area is a considerable distance from the county emergency operations center, the county should consider sending a representative to any active municipal or sub-county emergency operations centers to assist and gather information for use by the county at the county emergency operations center.
Recommendation # 56:

The Legislature should appropriate funds to the Department of Community Affairs to accelerate the updating of the regional hurricane evacuation studies, regional inland shelter studies, storm surge atlases, and regional hurricane loss and contingency planning studies.

Comments:

a. Effective planning and post-disaster response and recovery operations requires accurate information. The majority of Florida's regional hurricane evacuation studies, regional inland shelter studies, storm surge atlases, and regional hurricane loss and contingency planning studies are over five years old. No regional inland shelter study or regional hurricane loss and contingency planning study has been updated in the past five years.

b. If funds are limited, priority should be given to updating the behavioral study components of the regional hurricane evacuation studies and regional inland shelter studies. If the behavioral studies show significant changes, then funding priority should be given to updating transportation analyses to assess evacuation times and shelter space requirements.

c. Among the regions, priority for updates should be as follows:

(1) regions that have suffered major or catastrophic disasters since the last update; and

(2) other regions, starting with the oldest plans first.

d. After the behavioral study components, priority should be given to updating the storm surge atlases. These predict the extent to which storm surge waters will extend inland as a result of storms of different strengths. These atlases are based on computer models known as SLOSH (Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes) models.

e. The Department of Community Affairs has been appropriated $186,000 to update these studies and atlases in past years. The same level of funding has been requested for FY 1993-94. This funding is sufficient to update annually two or three studies or atlases. This level of funding is insufficient for the Department of Community Affairs to maintain a cycle of updating each of these documents even once every five years.
Recommendation # 57:

Every state and regional agency should have a designated emergency coordination officer and an alternate.

Comments:

a. This position should be responsible for coordinating the development and maintenance of agency emergency preparedness and post-disaster response and recovery plans, maintaining rosters of personnel that will be involved in disaster operations, and training such agency personnel to perform the functions they will be called upon to handle.

b. In addition, these individuals should be responsible for ensuring that every state facility, e.g., prisons, office buildings, universities, has a disaster preparedness plan that is approved by the local emergency management agency.

Recommendation # 58:

The Florida Legislature should provide funding to every county sufficient to ensure every county has a dedicated emergency preparedness officer.

Comments:

a. This position should be responsible for coordinating the development and maintenance of county evacuation, shelter, and post-disaster response and recovery plans and programs, conducting necessary training, and coordinating with the state and other emergency response agencies.

b. As of October 1991, the latest data available, 34 counties had a full-time emergency management director and the other 33 counties had a part-time director. The Department of Community Affairs should work with the Florida Association of Counties and appropriate legislative committee staff to update these figures as soon as possible.

c. The intent of the Committee is that every county should have available a full-time director. Many counties are already receiving funds passed through the state sufficient to have a full-time position. The Legislature should focus on ensuring that the poorer counties can afford this resource. Measures that should be considered include appropriating sufficient funding through a new trust fund, establishing matching grant programs, providing incentives to counties to use the multicounty pooling provisions contained in Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, and other means for accomplishing the intent of this recommendation in a cost-feasible manner.
Recommendation # 59:

The Florida Department of Community Affairs should immediately develop and implement two concurrent training programs. These programs should train (1) the individuals that will comprise Florida's post-disaster response and recovery team and (2) local government personnel on federal and state post-disaster response and recovery strategies and procedures.

Comments:

a. While specific disasters cannot be predicted, general performance in responding to any disaster can be improved by prior training.

b. To complement its training course for state personnel that will play a role in the state emergency post-disaster response and recovery team, the Department of Community Affairs should prepare a written handbook for each position that clearly spells out the position's duties, responsibilities and authority and provides guidelines for performing the function. The participation of the specific individuals that will be involved in the post-disaster response and recovery in the training programs should be mandatory.

c. In addition, the Department should immediately develop and implement a training program for local government personnel to help them to understand both how the federal and state governments will respond to disasters and how they can provide the information that federal and state agencies need to assist local governments effectively.

Recommendation # 60:

The Department of Community Affairs should establish a team that is not involved in evacuation operations to be responsible for pre-planning and implementing post-disaster response and recovery operations prior to a disaster's impact.

Comments:

a. During a mass evacuation prior to a hurricane's impact, the Department of Community Affairs uses its personnel to assist with ensuring the evacuation is successfully executed.

b. A small action team charged with post-disaster response and recovery planning before the disaster occurs could, while phone lines are still operational, begin prepositioning personnel and supplies and implementing other actions that will speed post-disaster response and recovery.
Recommendation # 61:

The Department of Community Affairs, in conjunction with appropriate state and federal agencies, should assist local jurisdictions in the development of urban search and rescue teams and create a statewide urban search and rescue program.

Comments:

a. It has been demonstrated that local jurisdictions are quickly overwhelmed with the problems associated with disasters. Budgetary cutbacks and manpower reductions are common problems that plague most municipal and county organizations. Because of this, essential services, such as emergency medical services, police and firefighting, are generally stretched to their limits by common daily emergencies. When faced with a major or catastrophic disaster, handling the crisis is generally beyond local organizations' capabilities.

b. Many local government personnel resources are not trained in large-scale urban search and rescue operations. In addition, local jurisdictions face problems staffing emergency medical and firefighting positions when they are directly affected by a disaster, i.e., loss of homes, concern for family members.

c. The state should review local and state assets to identify the resources available for a statewide urban search and rescue program. Teams could be established to increase local preparedness and provide assets that can be used for local, regional, state and national responses. Teams would serve as a resource to provide fresh, trained personnel to a disaster. The specialized team members would bring search, extrication, medical and other essential skills that otherwise might not be available to the community.

d. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has developed 25 such teams across the country. It is also now developing a program called PUSH to create the capability to send large, multifaceted strike teams into impacted areas immediately.

e. Florida should consider the establishment of three teams to comprise its program: one in North Florida and two in South Florida (one of which would be Metro-Dade's team). Two teams should be established in South Florida for the following reasons:

(1) the largest population concentration resides along the coast of South Florida;

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9 Metro-Dade County maintains one of the 25 teams.
(2) there is a large pool of emergency responders that have extensive experience in hurricane disaster response that are willing to participate in the program;

(3) the two teams would be able to train and interact with each other, resulting in reduced training costs;

(4) the Metro-Dade Task Force is under contract to the U.S. State Department to provide international training for disaster preparedness and to respond to disasters outside the United States. This commitment could pose a serious problem if key members of their team are training or otherwise unavailable; and

(5) the national program lacks the available resources in the eastern United States to cover U.S. possessions in the Caribbean and the Southeastern U.S.

f. This effort should be coordinated by the entity responsible for ESF # 4, fire and rescue, under the state post-disaster response and recovery element.

g. Urban search and rescue functions performed under ESF # 4 will not replace the functions currently performed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Coast Guard, Civil Air Patrol and other agencies with regular search missions.

Issue B: Improve Post-Disaster Intergovernmental Coordination

Recommendation # 62:

In major or catastrophic disasters, a disaster field office (DFO) should be established as soon as possible after the disaster incident. Federal, state, and local coordination should occur through co-location of key decision makers and public information officers at the disaster field office.

Comments:

a. Following a major or catastrophic disaster, it is important to bring key federal and state decision makers to the impacted counties as soon as possible. However, county emergency operations centers (EOCs) are not big enough to handle the federal, state and local government personnel that are involved in a post-disaster response and recovery to a major or catastrophic disaster.

b. Therefore, county emergency operations centers should be used to coordinate and implement post-disaster response and recovery operations by the county and cities within the county. The disaster field office should be used to coordinate federal and state post-disaster response and recovery operations with all impacted local governments. The top local government decision
makers should either operate out of the disaster field office or send a high level representative to the disaster field office. A disaster field office liaison should also be placed at the emergency operations center of impacted counties and at sub-county emergency operations centers if they are created.

c. The location of the joint information center near or in the disaster field office has been discussed in an earlier recommendation.

d. The above statements apply to major or catastrophic disasters. In the case of a minor disaster, the post-disaster response and recovery and public information effort should be coordinated out of the state and county emergency operations center(s).

Recommendation # 63:

In major or catastrophic disasters, a post-disaster response and recovery coordination task force should be established and be co-located at the disaster field office as soon as possible.

Comments:

a. The Committee heard substantial testimony that the post-disaster response and recovery to Hurricane Andrew suffered from several problems, including:

- inadequate communication between levels of government concerning specific needs;
- lack of full awareness of supply inventories and agency capabilities;
- failure to have a single person in charge with a clear chain of command; and
- inability to cut through bureaucratic red tape.

b. Use of a coordination task force that would cluster key decision makers together and meet at least daily in the disaster field office should help address the first two of these problems. If the chair of the coordination task force is given temporary authority to cut through red tape, commit resources and compel action, this would help address the last two of these problems.

c. The Presidential Task Force established by President Bush at the start of the second week after Andrew's landfall demonstrated the potential effectiveness of the task force approach. This task force was chaired by U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Andrew Card at the direction of President Bush.

d. The chair of the coordination task force should be the State Coordinating Officer in the event the impacted site is limited to one state and the disaster is classified as major. If the impacted area is multistate or the disaster is classified as catastrophic, the Federal Coordinating Officer
should chair the coordination task force because of the significant role the federal military will play.

e. In either case, the chair of the coordination task force should be given the authority to commit resources and compel action on all levels through an appropriate order from the Governor or the President.

Recommendation # 64:

The Department of Community Affairs should examine options for entering Florida into an Interstate Compact to share resources and coordinate responses to major and catastrophic disasters with other states.

Comments:

a. The Committee supports the concept of Florida entering into an interstate compact but believes additional research is needed before it recommends enactment of specific legislation. The Department of Community Affairs should identify the number of states that have adopted the legislation necessary to enter the compact, cost reimbursement procedures established in the compact, and how the compact could be administered.

b. The Department of Community Affairs should complete its examination in time for action by the 1993 Legislature.

c. Section 590.31, Florida Statutes, authorizes the Governor to enter into a compact for forest fire protection. This compact could be used as a model for an interstate compact for responding to major and catastrophic disasters.

Recommendation # 65:

The Department of Community Affairs should evaluate the executive orders issued by the Governor after Hurricane Andrew and prepare draft executive orders by May 1, 1993, to be used when declaring a state of emergency in response to major and catastrophic disasters.

Comments:

a. After Hurricane Andrew, the Governor issued over two dozen executive orders to expedite the post-disaster response and recovery. For example, orders were issued to suspend certain requirements of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, lift highway tolls, and allow for temporary licensure of medical professionals from other states.
b. To speed up post-disaster response and recovery efforts, the Department of Community Affairs should prepare executive orders containing provisions to accomplish actions that can be predicted to be needed given major or catastrophic disasters so that they occur when the Governor declares a state of emergency.

c. In preparing the draft executive order pursuant to this recommendation, the Department of Community Affairs should, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, assess whether the Legislature needs to grant additional emergency authority to state or regional agencies. For example, the Committee received testimony that the executive directors of water management districts should be granted emergency authority to undertake specified actions without first receiving approval from the governing board.

Recommendation #66:

The Department of Management Services should obtain special procurement provisions for state agencies during the post-disaster response and recovery phase when negotiating state contracts for lodging, rental cars, and air travel. In addition, reimbursement provisions in Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, should be revised to reflect the different conditions that exist during an emergency response.

Comments:

a. Because it hit South Florida, Hurricane Andrew required tremendous travel between Tallahassee and the impacted area. State agencies reported tremendous difficulties in finding lodging, renting cars, and high costs for air travel.

Recommendation #67:

The 1993 Legislature should amend Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, to allow counties to extend declarations of emergency declared locally for up to seven days.

Comments:

a. Counties currently have to renew declarations of emergency declared locally every 72 hours following the initial period of seven days. The Committee received testimony from several county emergency preparedness officials that the shortness of this period of time detracts from their ability to focus on responding to the emergency.

Recommendation #68:
The 1993 Legislature should amend Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, to provide incentives to local governments that enter into statewide mutual aid agreements.

Comments:

a. Mutual aid agreements can stretch resources and improve post-disaster response and recovery efforts.

b. Local governments participating in mutual aid agreements should be given additional preference when distributing state funds for emergency preparedness activities.

c. The Department of Community Affairs, regional entities, the Florida League of Cities, the Florida Association of Counties, the Florida Emergency Preparedness Association and other interested professional associations should work together to draft statewide agreements and to share responsibility in administering agreements.

d. Establishment of mutual aid agreements among members of various associations should also be encouraged. Progress is occurring in these areas. For example, Florida's sheriff departments have entered into a statewide mutual aid agreement administered by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. In addition, the Florida Fire Chiefs Association is actively pursuing a statewide mutual aid plan.

e. Systems should be put in place to advise decision makers allocating resources of the resources provided under mutual aid agreements so that they can ensure that other resources are being distributed according to need. This could involve establishing a telephone line in the state and applicable county emergency operations centers for use only by associations administering mutual aid agreements so that they can report assignments of resources and receive advice on where resources are needed.

Issue C: Security

Recommendation # 69:

To increase the effectiveness of security activities following a disaster, the 1993 Legislature should amend Chapter 23, Part I, Florida Statutes, to:

(a) give the Director of the Florida Mutual Aid Plan authority to command all state law enforcement personnel in times of disaster;

(b) allow the requirement that requested operational assistance agreements be in writing be waived for up to 90 days following the declaration of a disaster; and
(c) provide that the Director of the Florida Mutual Aid Plan shall serve as liaison and guide the flow of requests from local law enforcement for law enforcement services from the Florida National Guard.

Comments:

a. Chapter 23, Florida Statutes, currently provides that the Director of the Florida Mutual Aid Plan (the Executive Director of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement) is authorized to "coordinate, integrate, and implement law enforcement planning activities...." The suggested statutory revisions would enhance law enforcement operations and coordination during times of disaster.
Recommendation # 70:

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Florida National Guard should work with affected local law enforcement personnel to evaluate the need for stricter limits on access to heavily impacted disaster areas to facilitate post-disaster response and recovery operations.

Comments:

a. Testimony received from organizations responsible for restoring electrical power and telephone service indicated that their restoration work crews were noticeably hampered by the large number of sightseers allowed in impacted areas.

b. An identification system should be established to ensure personnel working to restore essential services, e.g., cellular phones, land-line telephones, and utilities, can move through security checkpoints with minimal delay.

c. Access controls need to be strict enough to maintain public safety, protect property, and give enough room to work crews so that they can maneuver their equipment, but not so strict as to unnecessarily exacerbate traffic problems or work against the welfare of impacted residents.

Recommendation # 71:

The Florida Department of Transportation should coordinate the reservation of one traffic lane on limited access highways for use by emergency responders during the early post-disaster response and recovery phase.

Comments:

a. Testimony received from organizations responsible for restoring electrical power and telephone service indicated that restoration work crews were noticeably hampered by poor transportation access to impacted areas because of heavy traffic.

b. Deployment of the Florida National Guard and other personnel movements to the disaster area were also severely slowed by the tremendous amount of traffic on major roadways.
Recommendation # 72:

The Legislature should authorize security and emergency response personnel to enter homes of special needs individuals who are on the special needs registry that are located in a declared disaster area. To preserve privacy rights, however, special needs individuals that would like for security and emergency response personnel to be able to enter their homes should authorize this action by registering in advance.

Comments:

a. After a disaster, many special needs individuals may be too frail or suffering from injuries to be able to answer their doors during security and search and rescue sweeps of the area. Authorizing security and emergency management personnel to enter homes would provide a last resort mechanism to help those individuals who need assistance but are unable to ask for it.

Recommendation # 73:

The 1993 Legislature should provide funding to the Florida National Guard for planning, training, participating in exercises, predeploying prior to issuance of an executive order, and responding immediately to emergencies.

Comments:

a. The Florida National Guard does not receive funding by the state for planning, training, participating in exercises, or predeploying before or responding immediately to emergencies.

b. The federal government does not provide funds for state programs and exercises involving the Florida National Guard.

c. It is important that local National Guard commanders, planners, and logisticians be actively involved at the local level in preparing for and participating in development of emergency plans and exercises that will upgrade the response to future emergencies.

Issue D: Expand Civil Liability Protections

Recommendation # 74:

The 1993 Legislature should amend Section 252.51, Florida Statutes, to broaden the civil liability protections already in the law to include protection for private or public persons who volunteer goods, services, materials, equipment, facilities or personnel.
Comments:

a. To paraphrase, Section 252.51, Florida Statutes, currently provides that, with certain exceptions, a person or organization that voluntarily and without compensation offers premises to be used as a shelter during an actual or practice emergency shall not be liable for accidents or injuries that happen while the shelter is being used.

b. To promote more active involvement from the private sector in post-disaster response and recovery activities, the Legislature should expand this liability protection to cover private or public persons who volunteer goods, services, materials, equipment, or personnel. Liability protection should not apply, however, when a person or organization acts with malicious intent or with willful disregard of human life, safety or property.

Issue E: Improve Federal Programs

Recommendations # 75:

The Governor and the Florida Legislature should request that Congress direct the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other federal agencies that are involved in response and recovery efforts to revise their procedures related to:

(a) providing financial and material assistance to disaster victims to ensure fairness and equity in the application and aid distribution process; and

(b) contracting for needed materials and services to ensure that minority contractors receive a proportionate share of the contracts and to ensure that local and in-state firms are given first consideration for contracts.

Comments:

a. During its meetings, the Committee received testimony about inequities in federal assistance programs. Both the working poor and working people experienced tremendous difficulty accessing help because of their income levels or inability to leave their work sites. And applicants with similar circumstances did not receive equal assistance.

b. Middle-income persons also reported that despite their ability to pay, they did not receive material assistance, e.g., housing, food and water. The lesson is that in a disaster the magnitude of Hurricane Andrew, access to money did not increase the odds of securing housing or supplies.

c. The news media widely reported instances of federal contracts for debris removal and other recovery activities that were awarded to out-of-state contractors when qualified local or in-state and minority contractors were available.
d. State and local officials involved in recovery efforts testified that despite requests to have local needs included in federal contracts or to piggy-back contracts to maximize cost savings, they were excluded from federal contracting processes.

**Recommendation # 76:**

The Governor and the Florida Legislature should request that Congress amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to require the Federal Emergency Management Agency's representatives to serve more proactively following disasters as advisors to state and local emergency responders and to simplify processes for requesting federal assistance.

**Comments:**

a. Federal representatives from the Federal Emergency Management Agency currently play the limited role of responding to state requests for assistance from the federal government. Because of the intensive experience of some of their personnel in responding to a wide range of disaster incidents, Federal Emergency Management Agency representatives should be empowered to act as advisors and consultants to state and county post-disaster response and recovery personnel during times of crisis.

**Recommendation # 77:**

The Governor and the Florida Legislature should request that Congress amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to provide for the predeployment or immediate activation of the military in response to a catastrophic disaster.

**Comments:**

a. The Stafford Act should be amended to provide that:

(1) the United States Department of Defense tailor and predesignate, in consultation with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, appropriate elements of the United States Armed Forces into task forces capable of providing administrative, logistical, and humanitarian support to a devastated population in the aftermath of natural disaster. Use of federal military resources in civil emergencies should be planned for in such a manner that does not prohibit execution of the primary national defense military mission;

(2) the posting of a hurricane watch by the National Hurricane Center for any coastal area of the United States serve as a triggering mechanism to alert military task forces assigned federal emergency assistance responsibilities;
(3) upon the posting of a hurricane warning by the National Hurricane Center for any coastal area of the United States, military liaison be immediately established with the Office of the Governor of the state or states affected by the warning;

(4) when the National Hurricane Center forecasts the impact of a catastrophic disaster predesignated units of the federal armed forces begin immediate deployment to destinations assigned by the Office of the Governor of the affected state or states; and

(5) military task force commanders receive and execute missions assigned by authorized civil authorities in a manner consistent with Department of Defense policies and regulations.

b. The damage and suffering caused by catastrophic disasters will exceed the post-disaster response and recovery capabilities of local and state governments and volunteer organizations.

c. The intent of this recommendation is that the military should establish a fully equipped and trained national disaster relief strike force that immediately responds to catastrophic disasters if ordered by the President pursuant to a request from the applicable governor.

Recommendation # 78:

The Federal Emergency Management Agency should amend the Federal Response Plan to establish a security ESF.

Comments:

a. The Federal Response Plan does not have an ESF for security. A Defense Coordinating Officer position is established to coordinate the military's involvement but no position exists to coordinate federal law enforcement efforts, such as those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Marshall Service, with state and local law enforcement efforts.

Recommendation # 79:

The Governor should request that U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development officials be on site immediately following a disaster and remain on a permanent basis until the relocation of all eligible persons has been accomplished.
Comments:

a. After Hurricane Andrew destroyed or rendered uninhabitable housing complexes administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, elderly and disabled residents were entitled to receive vouchers enabling them to move immediately into other available housing or hotels. Aging network service providers assisted residents who were unable to move back to destroyed housing that were unable to secure the necessary vouchers. To preclude this from happening again, there needs to be an established understanding of the responsibilities of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development during and after a disaster.

b. The Department of Community Affairs and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development should establish a performance agreement on these issues in advance of the 1993 hurricane season.

c. All local housing authorities should develop contingency plans for emergency housing assistance for tenants, if any, following disasters.

III. AVAILABILITY OF DAMAGE ASSESSMENT DATA

The ability to promptly assess damage following a disaster is a key facet of an effective post-disaster response and recovery effort. Damage assessments are needed for informed resource allocation decisions and requests for assistance and to guide activities of recovery personnel. In addition to the essential process of sending assessment teams physically into impacted areas, quick information can be obtained through computer information systems and aerial photography.

Issue A: Aerial and Ground Damage Assessments

Rapid aerial assessment, supplemented by ground reconnaissance teams, is necessary to identify damage to critical facilities and to identify immediate unmet emergency needs of disaster victims.

Recommendation # 80:

The State of Florida should enter into a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. Air Force or other providers to obtain immediate aerial video and still photography of areas impacted by major or catastrophic disasters.

Comments:

a. The Department of Community Affairs and the Florida National Guard should coordinate to implement this recommendation.
b. These photographs should be available at the state and applicable county emergency operations center in a timely manner.

c. The use of aerial photographs should be supplemented with ground reconnaissance to assure accurate information is compiled.

Recommendation #81:

The Department of Community Affairs should ensure that the post-disaster response and recovery element of the state comprehensive emergency management plan provides for rapid assessment teams, comprised of governmental and nongovernmental officials, to be immediately assembled, equipped, trained, and deployed into affected areas to assess the impacts of disasters on victims and critical facilities and services and report their findings to state and local emergency operations centers in a timely manner.

Comments:

a. Immediate and accurate damage assessments are essential for ensuring that proper actions are taken by decision makers in the post-disaster environment.

Issue B: Increase Use of Computerized Information Systems

Computerized information systems can provide quick information to decision makers during the post-disaster response and recovery phase. Known as geographic information systems, emergency management information systems, or other names, the use of computerized information systems is becoming increasingly common and practical. Many local governments and regional and state agencies have active computerized information systems. Coordination between these agencies and governments should be an important objective.

Recommendation # 82:

County emergency management agencies, with support from the Department of Community Affairs, are encouraged to have certain computerized data sets available in advance of a disaster.

Comments:

a. Based on the effort to respond to Hurricane Andrew, having certain computerized information data sets available will be especially valuable in making decisions in the post-disaster environment. A current version of these data should be prepared two months prior to the beginning of the hurricane season. The following computerized data sets would be most useful:
(1) Locations of available shelters with database tables containing information about capacities, facilities, hardening preparations, emergency power and communications capabilities, contact persons and agencies.

(2) Locations of fire stations, police stations, hospitals, and emergency medical stations with attributes about capacities, capabilities, hardening preparations, emergency power communications capabilities, and phone numbers.

(3) Locations of potential staging areas and temporary housing locations.

(4) Street centerlines with attributes for street names and address ranges. This coverage was invaluable in Dade County for producing base maps for use in the field immediately after the event.

(5) Demographic data. These data were invaluable for identifying areas of special need such as migrant camps or nursing homes. This coverage was also used to track the potential spread of disease. This information is available as a commercial product compatible with most systems.

(6) Locations of hazardous materials with information about special handling requirements and hazards. This would be useful for identifying areas of potential hazard or contamination.

(7) Locations of major food stores. These are potential sources of emergency food and water supplies.

(8) Utility networks such as power distribution and other utilities. Power networks should be available from electric utility companies. Other utilities such as water and sewer may not be available for all counties.

(9) Transportation bottlenecks identified on transportation network with recommended alternate routings. These problem areas should be available from the Florida Department of Transportation and should be incorporated into a pre-existing computerized coverage.

b. Counties should work with their applicable water management district(s), regional planning council, adjacent counties and cities, the Florida Department of Transportation and the Florida Growth Management Data Network Coordinating Council in implementing this recommendation.
c. The Department of Community Affairs should provide support to the counties in developing a standardized data set structure and in accessing pre-existing data sets from other agencies.

d. The work done by Florida City and Monroe County personnel after Hurricane Andrew to develop a complete integrated emergency management information system for South Dade County should be closely reviewed for use in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation # 83:

Counties should enter into agreements and contracts for operation of computerized data base systems prior to a storm event to expedite the recovery effort and take advantage of existing resources.

Comments:

a. Agreements should be in place with other agencies to provide technical personnel to assist in staffing the base station of the computerized system after the storm. Dade County's experience showed that even with a computerized system in place those directly impacted by the storm could not be expected to carry the full workload. Each agency with the appropriate resources can contribute to the recovery.

b. The state should maintain an inventory of those personnel with the appropriate skills and each state agency’s computerized information system resources. This roster should be updated annually two months prior to hurricane season.

Recommendation # 84:

The Department of Community Affairs and counties should ensure that use of computerized information systems is made a part of annual hurricane preparedness and recovery exercises to verify that data and resources are in a state of readiness.

Comments:

a. Hypothetical "strike" areas should be designated. Systems near the strike area should be designated as recovery systems. Their resources should be reviewed and the appropriate agreements should be in place to insure that their response will be appropriate.

b. Available computerized data should be reviewed and updated as needed.

Recommendation # 85:
The Department of Community Affairs should prepare a handbook on model post-disaster computerized information system procedures.
Comments:

a. The most important product to be produced first from the computerized information system is a series of base maps. These should show detailed streets and roads, should be a uniform scale, and should be produced in large quantities immediately after a disaster. These are invaluable for orientation, planning, and status maps. They are also useful for collecting data in the field for input into the computerized information system.

b. Supplemental maps should be produced as needed for specialized applications such as locations of kitchens, curfew areas, senior homes, damage assessment, and burn sites.

c. The handbook should specify procedures for assuring the fastest, most efficient entry of incoming data.

IV. MEDICAL CARE AND RELIEF

Following the catastrophic landfall of Hurricane Andrew, public health and medical response teams worked together through a single joint medical task force with representation from participating organizations and agencies. The Governor's Office and the Agency for Health Care Administration appointed the South Florida Hospital Association as the central command center for hurricane relief efforts for hospitals in south Florida. The command center, established at St. Mary's Hospital in Palm Beach County, served as the central point for hospital and health care relief efforts for the American Hospital Association and hospital and physician volunteer initiatives.

Issue A: Coordination of Medical Services

During the early response to Hurricane Andrew, it was apparent that no single entity was in control of the medical service response. The Committee's recommendation to include a health and medical emergency support function should remedy this problem. The health and medical ESF should be directed by the State Health Officer.

Recommendation # 86:

The 1993 Legislature should amend Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, to direct the State Health Officer to coordinate the immediate medical response to a declared state of emergency and empower him or her to issue and enforce public health advisories related to the emergency response.

Comments:
a. The State Health Officer could informally function in this capacity given current statutory authority to promote, protect and improve public health and authority to issue public health advisories pursuant to section 20.19, Florida Statutes. Amending Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, to formally designate the State Health Officer's role, however, helps to clarify the unique needs of emergency medical and public health response in responding to emergencies.

Issue B: Statewide Medical Plan

Recommendation # 87:

The evacuation, shelter and post-disaster response and recovery elements of the state comprehensive emergency management plan should contain components that detail emergency medical evacuation, availability of health care professionals in shelters, and emergency medical response for minor, major and catastrophic disasters.

Comments:

a. The plan for medical response should be modeled on the Federal Response Plan, and include similar support categories.

b. Joint planning responsibility for all health and medical related response agencies (governmental and private) should be delegated to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Service (the State Health Officer).

c. The plan should provide for:

   (1) prestaging supplies known to be needed in mass quantities, especially medical oxygen, chronic disease medication, and supplies needed to establish temporary pharmacies;

   (2) recruiting and deploying volunteer health care professionals, including provisions for assuring their adequate presence in shelters, waiving personnel licensing requirements for out-of-state health care professional participating in disaster relief, and supplying volunteers with food, water, transportation and lodging;

   (3) measures to ensure adequate communications with emergency operations centers, disaster medical assistance teams, shelters, mobile medical units, hospitals and other established care centers, and the disaster field office;

   (4) procedures for disseminating public health information;
the maintenance of disaster preparedness and response plans by hospitals and other health care facilities, including staffing plans and plans for dealing with lack of water and electrical power, and evacuation plans, including agreements with necessary transportation providers and alternative facilities, and that these plans are reviewed and strengthened where necessary;

the roles and goals of providers, government, voluntary relief organizations, the National Disaster Medical System, and others involved in emergency medical response to disasters, and identify gaps in coverage;

security measures to prevent loss of medical supplies from looting, and to ensure the safety of those volunteers providing care and delivering the supplies; and

procedures to ensure the proper disposal of medical waste.

Issue C: Emergency Pharmacies

One concern cited by health care professionals and members of the general public was the difficulty in obtaining prescription drugs during the response to Hurricane Andrew. While Governor Chiles did issue an executive order to allow emergency refill of prescriptions, the Committee recommends that Florida Statutes be amended to codify such emergency provisions.

Recommendation # 88:

The 1993 Legislature should amend Section 465.0275, Florida Statutes, to permit pharmacists to dispense a one-time, emergency refill of up to a 30-day supply of a prescribed medication and Section 465.019, Florida Statutes, to allow hospital institutional pharmacies to dispense prescribed medications to the general public in counties included in an emergency or disaster declaration order.

Comments:

a. Statutory authority for these issues will permit immediate assistance to the community.

V. COORDINATION OF VOLUNTEERS, DONATIONS AND SUPPLIES

Issue A: Effective Receipt and Distribution of Donations

The Florida Relief Center was established in partnership with voluntary organizations and associations, including the Florida Emergency Preparedness Association, American Red Cross, and United Way, and Governor Chiles directed essential resources to expand and sustain the operation.
The use of a single receiving point for donated goods in the relief effort for Hurricane Andrew proved tremendously successful.

The Florida Relief Center, established at the South Florida Fairgrounds, coordinated the receipt and distribution of donated supplies and goods. Governor Lawton Chiles designated the center as the single receiving point for all donations. More than 20,000 volunteers donated hours of service at the center; between 80 and 120 trucks per day ferried donated supplies to subdistribution points in the disaster area. Based on this success, the Committee recommends that future disaster response plans include a similar operation and encourage all relief agencies to work through this single operation.

**Recommendation # 89:**

**The post-disaster response and recovery element of the state comprehensive emergency plan should establish a uniform, single-point-of-receipt system for receiving and distributing supplies.**

Comments:

a. At a minimum, this system should include:

   (1) designation of potential sites in every county and in each region that are pre-approved for use by the property owner;\(^{10}\);

   (2) lists of needed equipment and potential suppliers;

   (3) memoranda of understanding for acquiring key packing and moving equipment, e.g., conveyor belts, pallets, forklifts, back support belts, boxes, shrink wrap, and trucks;

   (4) memoranda of understanding with shipping or distribution companies for personnel and computer software to run facilities;

   (5) methods for getting goods to individuals who are frail, elderly, disabled or homebound, e.g., roving distribution centers, meals-on-wheels drivers, senior centers or temporary public transit systems;

   (6) arrangements for food, water, lodging, and medical needs for volunteers working at the staging and distribution areas;

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\(^{10}\) Florida’s existing network of fairgrounds should be considered for this purpose.
(7) standard operating procedures for regional and county staging and distribution facilities; and

(8) a communications system to link staging areas, distribution centers, the disaster field office, the state emergency operations center and the county emergency operations center.

b. The Department of Community Affairs should coordinate the development of this plan with appropriate volunteer organizations. Voluntary organizations that have established roles in the disaster response and have predesignated distribution systems should continue their use of these systems and coordinate with the staging area.

c. The Department of Community Affairs should develop this system in conjunction with county emergency management officials and conduct training as needed to assure county officials are thoroughly informed about its intended operation.

Recommendation # 90:

The Department of Community Affairs should coordinate the execution of memoranda of understanding with suppliers of potable water to assure adequate supplies in the event of a disaster.

Comments:

a. The Department of Community Affairs, in conjunction with the state agency with lead responsibility for the public works and engineering emergency support function (ESF # 3) of the state comprehensive emergency management plan should enter into memoranda of understanding to provide for water in case of major and catastrophic disasters. County memoranda of understanding should address water needs for minor disasters. Care should be taken to ensure that suppliers do not over commit resources. Memoranda of understanding should require water bottles to be dated to assure use prior to expiration of shelf life.

Recommendation # 91:

The 1993 Legislature should amend appropriate chapters of the Florida Statutes related to the tax code, to authorize:

(a) the Governor and Cabinet to waive excise taxes on fuels donated for emergency use within 96 hours of a disaster declaration when solicited by the state; and

(b) the Executive Director of the Department of Revenue to extend due dates of tax returns and waive interest on taxes due during the time of a declared state of disaster.
Comments:

a. The Governor and Cabinet and the Executive Director of the Department of Revenue have limited authority to waive taxes due. This includes no authority to relieve a taxpayer of taxes due even if the state solicited a donation for emergency use to protect life and property during an emergency as the result of a disaster.

b. Petroleum suppliers are reluctant to create a tax liability for their businesses by donating fuel inventories.

c. To facilitate relief efforts in time of a disaster, the Legislature should give the Governor and Cabinet or the Executive Director of the Department of Revenue the authority to waive taxes on fuels donated for emergency use. This would be limited to utilities and fuels necessary for emergency equipment, law enforcement, and others equipment and supplies needed to protect life or property.

d. Sales and use taxes are already avoidable on items other than fuel if items are purchased by a tax exempt entity or if funds are donated to an exempt entity to purchase needed items.

e. The Department of Revenue currently has no authority to grant extensions of due dates regardless of circumstances. Late filing of tax returns as a result of the effects of a disaster is a valid basis for compromise or waiver of the penalty under Chapter 213, Florida Statutes. Giving the Department of Revenue authority to extend due dates would simplify the current steps necessary to deal equitably with taxpayers.

f. The Department of Revenue has limited authority to waive interest charges, even in cases where the state delayed notifying a taxpayer of liability as the result of a natural disaster. During the time of a natural disaster, it can be difficult -- if not impossible -- to contact taxpayers regarding errors in their return filing. Suspension of collection efforts can subject taxpayers to additional interest charges that might otherwise have been avoided. While in most cases this interest is due, from an equity standpoint there may be circumstances of reasonable cause that would indicate a compromise or waiver of interest is appropriate.

g. The Department of Revenue should be tasked with preparing this legislative proposal.

Recommendation # 92:

A public education program should be created to educate people on what should and should not be donated.

Comments:
a. The American public responded to the devastation of Hurricane Andrew with a flood of donations. As goods were received at the Florida Relief Center, they were unloaded, sorted, labeled and stored. One of the most difficult issues faced by those managing the center was the constantly growing pile of clothing and other items that were unusable due to their storage containers (glass or rusty) or were not needed (clothing, odd food items and furnishings). Handling donated items not in great need delayed distribution of much needed items. Although the center attempted to control the flow of donated goods through releasing statements detailing what items were needed and what items were not, many unneeded items poured in.

b. This could involve public service announcements, information in local telephone books, mailings before hurricane season, media releases, pamphlets made up before hurricane season, and prerecorded messages that would play on the telephone hot-line for donations and volunteers.

**Issue B: Coordination of Volunteers**

**Recommendation # 93:**

The post-disaster response and recovery elements of the state and county plans recommended earlier in this chapter should include provisions for volunteer coordination.

Comments:

a. The plan should establish procedures for a volunteer clearinghouse for health care professionals. Numerous volunteers responded to the needs of south Florida following Hurricane Andrew. Because no coordinated plan for using volunteer health care professionals existed, many volunteers experienced frustration and were under used. The lack of a process to waive licensure requirements, yet verify an individual's credentials to render health care services, was also problematic.

(1) This should be included as a component of the health and medical ESF.

(2) The clearinghouse should be maintained on a year-round basis but be designed with a mechanism that allows it to be augmented for minor, major and catastrophic disasters.

(3) A toll-free bank of telephone lines should be pre-established for use following a disaster. Perhaps this could be dovetailed into the hot-line used for other volunteers and donations.

b. The plan should establish a procedure to establish single points of contact for volunteer information.
The task of coordinating volunteers who wished to assist in relief efforts was managed by both the Governor's Office and the Dade County Manager's Office at the disaster field office. Recognizing the enormity of the task, the Governor's Office reached an agreement with the United Way of Dade County to coordinate volunteer efforts. The Governor's Office referred volunteers to the United Way's already established Volunteer Center, which matched volunteers with the needs of communities. In return, when the Governor's Office was made aware of situations which demanded immediate volunteer assistance, the United Way placed volunteers to meet the need. Because this reciprocal agreement worked well, the Committee recommends similar relationships be formalized prior to the 1993 hurricane season.

One approach would be for the Department of Community Affairs, on behalf of the state, and counties to enter into memoranda of understanding with Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters and other key volunteer organizations.

Provisions for these memoranda of understanding should be included in county and state post-disaster plans. The memoranda of understanding should vary based on the magnitude of the disaster. Memoranda of understanding should be entered into with Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters and other key volunteer organizations, e.g., the American Red Cross, the United Way, and the Salvation Army. The memoranda of understanding should, at a minimum:

(a) address volunteer training (at least for volunteers that will be called upon to act as managers) for each responsibility accepted by the volunteer organization;

(b) designate single points of contact for volunteer coordination at the state and county levels;

(c) provide for "lead volunteer organization" assignments and means for coordinating with other organizations;

(d) ensure multilingual volunteers; and

(e) provide for teams from outside areas that can move quickly into impacted areas in the case of major or catastrophic disasters.

The Department of Community Affairs should provide a model memorandum of understanding to assist counties in formulating their agreements.

c. The plan should outline a mechanism to establish a large capacity volunteer and donation telephone hot-line to receive offers for assistance, to provide directions to people that wish to
give money or goods, and to quickly provide the names of potential volunteers to the volunteer coordinators.

(1) At the Governor's request, 200 telephone lines were installed at the Florida Relief Center under the number "1-800-FL HELP 1." The lines were installed by Southern Bell and the equipment was donated by Northern Telecom to make the system operational within a 24-hour period. This line raised more than $3 million for the victims of Hurricane Andrew. More than 66,000 calls were answered in a three-week period and more than 25,000 volunteer hours were given to the telephone operation. Given the success of this operation, the Committee recommends that arrangements be made each year prior to hurricane season to be able to quickly establish a toll-free phone bank.

(2) This could involve pre-establishing a system with one or more different companies, e.g., the Home Shopping Network, AT&T. The Federal Emergency Management Agency could be asked to set this up for national access following major or catastrophic disasters.

(3) An automated answering system could be used to answer and direct incoming calls to telephone volunteers who can provide the latest information about making donations or volunteering.

(4) While callers are on hold a prerecorded message could explain the types of donations that are not needed.
CHAPTER THREE: FUNDING

I. FLORIDA DEVOTES INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

In FY 1992-93, Florida is spending about 68 cents per person for emergency preparedness and recovery programs. The Department of Community Affairs’ budget for emergency management is just over $8.8 million\textsuperscript{11}. This is comprised of $1.4 million in state general revenue, $1.7 million from the state hazardous materials trust fund, $3.6 million from the federal government, and $2.1 million from power companies that operate nuclear power plants. Over two-thirds of the federal funding is distributed to counties for local emergency management preparedness and recovery activities. Of the funding being passed through to counties in FY 1992-93, Metro-Dade County is receiving the most ($121,932) and Union County the least ($4,521).

In fiscal year 1993-94, the Department of Community Affairs has requested $14.3 million for emergency management programs, $3.6 million of which would come from state general revenue, $1.9 million from the state hazardous materials trust fund, $3.6 million from the federal government, and $2.2 million from nuclear power plants\textsuperscript{12}. If this amount were fully appropriated, state funding for emergency management would rise to 87 cents per person. This would contrast with the steady decline in the level of spending per capita on emergency management programs seen in recent years.

Unfortunately, neither current nor requested levels of state funding are sufficient to bring Florida and its political subdivisions to the state of readiness necessary to handle future major and catastrophic disasters. The Governor and the Legislature must remedy this crucial shortcoming if Florida is to implement necessary improvements in its emergency preparedness and recovery programs and facilities.

\textsuperscript{11} In addition, the DCA receives an annual appropriation of $3 million in spending authority, not actual funds, to be used to respond to disasters. When this spending authority is used, the source of the funds usually is split 75 percent federal and 25 percent state.

\textsuperscript{12} The DCA is again requesting an additional $3 million in spending authority, not actual funds, in the event of actual disasters.
Issue A: Create an Emergency Management Preparedness and Disaster Assistance Trust Fund

Recommendation # 94:

The Legislature should establish an Emergency Management Preparedness and Assistance Trust Fund to be administered by the Department of Community Affairs.

Comments:

a. As of FY 1991-92, state general revenue funding to support emergency management had decreased 31 percent over the past three fiscal years.

b. Because of reductions in revenue, the Department of Community Affairs had, as of February 1992:

   (1) eliminated its positions responsible for surveying buildings outside of surge zones for potential use as shelters;

   (2) conducted no updates of hurricane inland shelter studies or hurricane loss and contingency planning studies for the past four years;

   (3) held only two statewide hurricane preparedness exercises since 1985; and

   (4) reduced funding to train shelter managers by 77 percent (to $13,800) and reduced funding to support the Florida Wing of the Civil Air Patrol by 55 percent (to $25,000).

c. The Speaker's Task Force on Emergency Preparedness in 1990 recommended the creation of a Disaster Preparedness Trust Fund. This proposal has been considered by subsequent legislatures but has not yet been implemented.

d. The revenue source for the trust fund should be determined by the Legislature. The Committee strongly recommends, however, that the funding source selected have a logical relationship to the purpose of the trust fund.

e. Options that should be considered to capitalize the trust fund include: a percentage surcharge on premiums paid for property and casualty insurance policies, a surcharge on marina docking fees or other boat fees, a surcharge on building permits, or fees on transactions or specified activities in high-risk areas. If some form of a surcharge is used, a percentage of the funds collected should be retained by the collecting entity to cover administrative costs in accordance with established procedures.
f. The funding source contained in HB 3669 (1990), which was drafted to implement the recommendations of the Speaker's Task Force, was a $2 surcharge on homeowners' property insurance policies and a $4 surcharge on business or commercial property insurance policies. The funding source contained in HB 3669 (1990) would have raised about $13.6 million annually according to a legislative staff analysis.

g. The revenues placed into the trust fund should be sufficient to effectively implement current programs and the recommendations of the Committee implemented by the Legislature, executive agencies, or local governments.

h. Monies from the trust fund should be used to improve state and county emergency preparedness and recovery programs and facilities. They should supplement, not replace, existing federal, state and local funds used for emergency management. In addition, the Department of Community Affairs should be given the authority to leverage the funds when possible and appropriate, for example, by requiring local match.
APPENDIX A: FISCAL NOTES

CHAPTER ONE: BEFORE THE STORM

I. COMMUNICATIONS

Issue A: Public Education

Recommendation # 1:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that it would need a new public information specialist position to carry out this recommendation. The recurring cost of this position would be $45,572 (salaries, benefits, OCO, and expenses). In addition, the Department of Community Affairs should be given $50,000 in recurring OPS funds to implement projects in support of this campaign.

b. This position should be empowered to arrange private sponsorship of public education pieces and supplies, e.g. arrangements with grocery stores to put hurricane preparedness information on milk cartons.

c. Establishment of this position is essential to the accomplishment of many of the recommendations in this report for improving communications with the public.

d. The Department of Community Affairs should aggressively pursue donations of equipment, materials, personnel, and air time to support this public information campaign.

Issue B: Pre-Disaster Communication with the Public

Recommendation # 2:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that it can implement this recommendation if it receives the public information specialist position discussed in recommendation #1.

Recommendation # 3:

a. Most telephone companies will publish this information without charge as a public service to the community.

b. The Department of Community Affairs can assist counties in the implementation of this recommendation if it receives the public information specialist position discussed in recommendation #1.
Recommendation # 4:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that it can accomplish this assessment if it receives the public information specialist position discussed in recommendation #1.

Issue C: Communications Among Emergency Response Agencies

Recommendation # 5:

a. With an installation charge of approximately $600 per National Warning System drop and a recurring monthly charge of approximately $500, the first-year cost of installing the National Warning System in the 18 counties presently without it would be approximately $19,800. Annual recurring charges thereafter would be approximately $108,000.

Recommendation # 6:

a. Recommendation #5 discusses the fiscal implications of ensuring that all counties are linked into the National Warning System.

Recommendation # 7:

a. At a unit cost of approximately $4,000, the cost of purchasing a 100-watt high-frequency base transceiver, tuner and antenna for those 50 counties without high frequency radios would be approximately $200,000.

b. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that the training activities discussed under this recommendation can be implemented by the Department of Management Services using the two positions discussed in recommendation # 37.

Recommendation # 8:

a. At a unit cost of approximately $4,500 for the base station and antenna, and a monthly line charge of approximately $150, the first year cost of purchasing and operating these LGRs in all counties would be approximately $422,100. The annual recurring line charges thereafter would be approximately $120,600.
II.  EVACUATION

Issue A: Improve Evacuation Planning

Recommendation # 9:

a. The Department of Community Affairs has four regional coordinator positions on staff. If the Department of Community Affairs were to place one position in each major media market to promote regional planning and coordination, it would need an additional six positions to accomplish the regional component of this recommendation. The Department estimates the costs for these positions at $295,734 (salaries, benefits, OCO and expenses). In the event that the Department receives matching funds from the federal government for these positions, this amount would be reduced.

b. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that the remainder of this recommendation can be implemented within existing resources.

Recommendation # 10:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that the implementation of this recommendation would be enhanced by updates to the 10 regional evacuation studies and 11 regional inland shelter studies. See recommendation # 56 for an estimate of the cost to prepare these updates.

b. The state-funded, dedicated county emergency management official recommended in recommendation # 58 would be responsible for preparing and maintaining the county evacuation plan. Additional costs for preparing the element would need to be determined on a project-specific basis.

Recommendation # 11:

a. The costs incurred by the applicable emergency management agency in reviewing an evacuation plan should be funded by a review fee paid by the institution.

b. The cost to the institutions to prepare these plans has not been determined but should not be significant as these facilities should have already considered these issues.

Recommendation # 12:

a. None.
Issue B: Refuges of Last Resort

Recommendation # 13:

a. Not determined.

Issue C: Transportation Improvements

Recommendation # 14:

a. The Florida Department of Transportation estimates that the rule can be adopted using existing resources.

b. The amount of lost toll revenues would depend on the facilities impacted and the duration of evacuation and recovery.

Recommendation # 15:

a. The Florida Department of Transportation estimates that the overall impact would be minor. The amount of lost toll revenues would depend on the facilities impacted and the time required to alleviate the traffic problem.

Recommendation # 16:

a. The Florida Department of Transportation estimates that the initial study would cost $50,000 and advises that the cost could be absorbed in its existing budget. The cost to actually reverse one or more lanes would be determined in the study.

Recommendation # 17:

a. Project costs for these improvements are already included in the Florida Department of Transportation's five-year work program.

Recommendation # 18:

a. The Florida Department of Transportation estimates that the study would cost $150,000 and advises that the cost could be absorbed in its existing budget.

Recommendation # 19:
a. The Florida Department of Transportation estimates that $500,000 would be needed to purchase an adequate supply of programmable signs. This amount would provide for the acquisition of ten signs (at a cost of $50,000 per sign).

Issue D: Marinas and Bridges

Recommendation # 20:

a. The City of Miami has estimated that boats left in the Dinner Key Marina caused roughly two-thirds of the $2.5 million in damage experienced by the marina. Based on this figure, the cost of implementing this recommendation could be substantial.

b. Persons docking vessels at marinas could be assessed an annual fee to capitalize a special insurance fund for this purpose.

Recommendation # 21:

a. This rule can be promulgated by the Florida Department of Transportation using existing resources.

b. The cost of the educational program should be limited but the exact cost cannot be determined until the program is established.

III. SHELTER

Issue A: Improve Shelter Planning and Operations

Recommendation # 22:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that OPS funds of $250,000 annually would be needed to collect and maintain the shelter inventory and data base, evaluate the structural soundness of additional shelters, and establish model shelter guidelines.

b. Information on shelter demand would be provided through the updated regional evacuation and inland shelter studies (see the fiscal note for recommendation # 56).

c. Establishing a full-time special needs disaster assistance coordinator at each of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the Department of Elder Affairs, the Department of Labor and Employment Security, and the Agency for Health Care Administration would cost approximately $205,050 per year for salaries, benefits, and standard expense and operating capital outlay packages (four positions).
d. The state-funded, dedicated county emergency management official recommended in recommendation # 58 would be responsible for updating and maintaining the county shelter plan. Additional costs for preparing the element would need to be determined on a project-specific basis.

e. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that remaining tasks can be accomplished within existing resources and those identified as needed to implement recommendation # 9.

Issue B: Increase Use of Public Buildings

Recommendation # 23:

a. The Department of Education estimates that it would cost between $100,000 and $150,000 to develop the design criteria. The Committee expects that the actual changes needed to the building code will be modest, and, therefore, that the cost of implementing this recommendation will be modest when applied to new buildings before design work begins on them.

Recommendation # 24:

a. The Department of Education estimates that the survey program will cost at least $1 million. This is based on a minimum cost of $4,000 to survey buildings at each of the roughly 2,500 schools. This figure should be assumed to be a low estimate. The cost of surveying community college and university buildings should be comparable per building.

b. Costs for the retrofitting program cannot be determined until the number of facilities and the type of retrofitting needed is identified. Costs in the hundreds of millions of dollars are anticipated. For example, the Department of Education has estimated that the addition of hurricane shutters can cost as much as $400 per window.

Recommendation # 25:

a. The Department of Management Services estimates that it would cost approximately $45,000 to establish shelter criteria to be used in the design of state buildings.

b. The cost of retrofitting existing state-owned buildings would have to be determined by a survey of existing facilities. The Department of Management Services estimates that about $15,000 per building should be budgeted for a retrofit study, for a budget of $675,000.

c. The cost of implementing shelter design criteria cannot be determined precisely but can be estimated. The Department of Management Services recently built a facility for Monroe County that was hardened because it contains a county emergency operations center. The
Department of Management Services estimates that including the additional features to harden the structure added about 7.5 percent to the cost of the building.

**Issue C: Reduce Shelter Demand**

**Recommendation # 26:**

a. The Department of Community Affairs can evaluate the fiscal impact and feasibility of this recommendation using existing resources.

b. While the potential impact on mobile home affordability cannot be precisely determined, the Florida Manufactured Housing Association estimates that the total cost of providing hurricane shelters in all parks of over 100 lots would be $420.1 million. This calculation assumes 98 percent of parks containing at least 100 lots are located outside of the category three surge zone; each home is occupied by an average of two people; 20 square feet per person shelter space is needed; 50 percent of homes would be occupied during hurricane season; shelter features include storm shutters, electric generators, and potable water storage capability; and shelter construction costs of $80 per square foot.

c. There are 262,542 lots in mobile home parks containing at least 100 lots that are located outside of the category three surge zone. If the total cost of providing shelter is divided by this number of lots, each lot owner's share would equal $1,600 ($240.1 million divided by 262,542). If this amount were paid off over the term of a 15-year mortgage, the monthly payment required by each lot would be very modest.

d. In addition, in parks where inadequate space exists for a shelter, acquiring a shelter site would displace at least four homes per park at an average cost of $140,000 per park.

**Recommendation # 27:**

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that it can promote the development and adoption of model code requirements and incentives using existing resources.

b. The costs of new building standards could be substantial depending on the options and approaches selected. The lowest cost approaches which are consistent with technically solid judgment should be evaluated. Options such as requiring shutters or laminated glass could add thousands of dollars to housing costs. Sheltered spaces or strengthened structure requirements may have lower cost impacts.

**Recommendation # 28:**
a. Until the new standards are established and existing structures are surveyed, the fiscal impact of this recommendation cannot be determined.
Issue D: Improve Registration of Shelter Occupants

Recommendation # 29:

a. The American Red Cross estimates a fiscal impact of $50,000 to $75,000 for every 30 shelters.

Issue E: Improve Sheltering of People with Special Needs

Recommendation # 30:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that this recommendation can be implemented within existing resources.

Recommendation # 31:

a. The Agency for Health Care Administration estimates that this recommendation will have fiscal impacts on the state and facilities that fall under the new definition. Costs to the state will include developing and adopting minimum criteria for the preparation of disaster plans and educating staff. Costs to facilities will include the cost of preparing or updating disaster plans. Precise cost estimates could not be determined.

Recommendation # 32:

a. The costs incurred by agencies in reviewing disaster plans should be funded by review fees paid by submitting institutions.

b. The cost to the institutions to prepare these plans has not been determined but should not be significant as these facilities have already been required to consider these issues.

Recommendation # 33:

a. The Department of Community Affairs projects that this recommendation can be implemented by the state with available resources. Nursing homes subject to the rule will be impacted to the extent that they must revise disaster plans to respond to the requirements of the revised rule and to the extent that alternative host facilities require payment for providing shelter services during a disaster.

Recommendation # 34:
a. The Department of Community Affairs cannot determine the fiscal impacts of implementing this recommendation at this time; however, collecting registration information at intake points should keep costs down.

Recommendation # 35:

a. The fiscal impact of this recommendation cannot be determined at this time; however, collecting registration information at intake points should keep costs down.

Recommendation # 36:

a. The Department of Community Affairs projects that the costs of implementing this recommendation will be limited to the costs associated with rule making and can be implemented within existing resources. The Department cannot determine costs to the Medicaid Program, as these would vary from disaster to disaster.

CHAPTER TWO: AFTER THE STORM

I. POST-DISASTER COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Issue A: Coordination of Emergency Communications

Recommendation # 37:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that two new positions in the Division of Communications of the Department of Management Services would be necessary to implement this recommendation at a cost of $102,500 (salaries, benefits, OCO, and expenses). These positions would also provide specialized support to the Communications ESF before, during, and after disasters.

b. Establishing the Communications ESF is part of a larger recommendation addressing Florida's entire post-disaster response and recovery strategy. The state's emergency operations center will have to be reconfigured to accommodate the suggested new organizational structure. See recommendation # 52 for an estimate of the cost of this reconfiguration.

Recommendation # 38:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that this recommendation can be implemented by the Department of Management Services using the two additional positions discussed in recommendation # 37.
Issue B: Coordination of Post-Disaster Emergency Communications

Recommendation # 39:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that this recommendation can be implemented within existing resources.

Recommendation # 40:

a. Recommendation # 5 discusses the fiscal implications of ensuring that all counties in Florida are linked into the National Warning System.

Recommendation # 41:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that the open purchase orders and memoranda of understanding can be negotiated by the two additional positions discussed in recommendation # 37.

b. The costs of using the open purchase orders and memoranda of understanding cannot be determined. If a Presidential Disaster Declaration is issued, the federal government will pay 75 percent, and in some extreme cases more, of these costs. Without a Presidential Disaster Declaration, the state will bear 100 percent of the costs.

Recommendation # 42:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that this recommendation can be implemented within existing resources.

Recommendation # 43:

a. At a unit cost of approximately $3,000 per base station, $17,000 per extendable antenna, and $1,000 per hand-held radio, the cost of establishing an 800 MHz radio network for emergency workers would be approximately $140,000 to $240,000 depending on the number of hand-held radios purchased.

Recommendation # 44:

a. As the cellular industry is already working to move to digital technology and to create the capability to prioritize phones, no additional costs would be placed on the industry by this recommendation.
Recommendation # 45:

a. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement has estimated the cost of the Emergency Communications and Command Center Vehicle to be $1,260,500 and the cost of the Security Control Center Vehicle to be $520,500. This includes two special agent positions to maintain and staff the vehicles in addition to equipment costs.
Recommendation # 46:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that this recommendation can be implemented within existing resources.

Issue C: Coordinating the Release of Information and Instructions to the Public

Recommendation # 47:

a. Creation and use of standardized formats and procedures for release of information can be accomplished using existing resources. In addition, pursuant to the Federal Response Plan, the Federal Emergency Management Agency will be establishing a joint information center in the event of a major or catastrophic disaster so use of the joint information center as a single point of release will have no appropriations consequences.

b. The cost to pre-select, harden, and wire up to 14 facilities cannot be precisely determined. Costs would vary depending on the physical improvements needed and the distance of the buildings from the different emergency operations centers.

Recommendation # 48:

a. The cost to implement this recommendation should be limited to the cost of the signs denoting the facilities.

Recommendation # 49:

a. None.

Recommendation # 50:

a. The Department of Community Affairs can implement this recommendation using existing resources.

II. POST-DISASTER RESPONSE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS

Issue A: Improve Planning for Post-Disaster Response and Recovery

Recommendation # 51:

a. None.
Recommendation # 52:

a. This recommendation will require actions by numerous agencies. Many of the actions are similar to functions currently performed and should not require additional appropriations. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that existing personnel and the resources identified as needed in recommendations # 9 and # 22 should be sufficient to implement this recommendation.

b. The Department of Community Affairs advises that the state emergency operations center would need to be reconfigured to serve the new ESF-based organizational structure. The cost of reconfiguring the emergency operations center and installing emergency telephone and electrical systems necessary to support this concept is estimated to be $150,000 to $200,000.

c. The Department of Community Affairs estimates the cost of an annual hurricane preparedness exercise sufficient to test state and county emergency management plans and programs could be as low as $50,000.

Recommendation # 53:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that implementing this recommendation will require actions on the part of many agencies; however, it projects that rulemaking activities should not require substantial expenditure of additional resources.

Recommendation # 54:

a. The state-funded, dedicated county emergency management official recommended in recommendation # 58 would be responsible for updating and maintaining the county shelter plan. Additional costs for preparing the element would need to be determined on a project-specific basis.

Recommendation # 55:

a. Implementation of this recommendation should not require resources in addition to those that would have to be expended in responding to a disaster in any event.

Recommendation # 56:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that updating the 10 regional evacuation studies and 11 regional inland shelter studies will cost about $50,000 to $65,000 per update, for a total cost of approximately $1,050,000 to $1,365,000.
b. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that updating the 10 storm surge atlases and
11 hurricane loss and contingency planning studies will be approximately $50,000 to $65,000
per update for a total cost of $1,050,000 to $1,365,000.

Recommendation # 57:

a. Every state and regional agency with any role in Florida's emergency management system
should designate a person and an alternate from existing resources.

b. The state comprehensive emergency management plan discussed in
recommendation # 52 calls for creation of 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Because
of the intensive responsibilities associated with being the lead agency responsible for an ESF,
these agencies should be given an additional position to handle these roles. As the ESFs have
not been assigned, up to 12 agencies could need an additional position to handle their ESF
responsibilities. In addition, because of their responsibilities in many of the ESFs, the Florida
National Guard should receive a position.

c. If a cost of $50,000 per position per year were assumed, including salaries, benefits, expenses,
OCO, and modest program costs, establishment of dedicated emergency management
coordinators at up to 13 agencies would generate a recurring cost of $650,000. If this cost
were matched by federal funds, this cost could be halved.

d. The designation of alternates should not have a fiscal impact as these individuals should come
from existing personnel.

Recommendation # 58:

a. Many counties are currently receiving federal funds passed through the state that are sufficient
to fund a full-time position. The Legislature should focus on ensuring that the poorer counties
can afford this resource. Measures that should be considered include appropriating sufficient
funding through a new trust fund, establishing matching grant programs, providing incentives to
counties to use the multicounty pooling provisions contained in Chapter 252, Florida Statutes,
and other means for accomplishing the intent of this recommendation in a cost-feasible manner.

b. If the Legislature chooses to make this investment only in those counties without full-time
directors, the recurring cost would be $825,000 (assuming a cost of $50,000 per position per
year, including salaries, benefits, expenses, OCO, and modest program costs) with the cost
being matched by Federal Emergency Management Assistance funds on a 50:50 matching
basis.
Recommendation # 59:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that implementation of this recommendation will require $100,000 in OPS funds.

Recommendation # 60:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that four additional planner positions will be needed to implement this recommendation at an estimated annual cost of $211,204 (salaries, benefits, OCO packages, and expenses).

Recommendation # 61:

a. The three teams would be comprised of existing county and city personnel. Modest costs should be anticipated for program administration and team training. Costs for activation of the teams would be borne by the federal or state government or benefitting communities, depending on the scope of the disaster, and the source of the activation request.

b. Costs to the state for this program should be limited if adequate support can be obtained from the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Issue B: Improve Post-Disaster Intergovernmental Coordination

Recommendation # 62:

a. Implementation of this recommendation will not require expenditures in excess of what would be required under current response procedures.

Recommendation # 63:

a. Implementation of this recommendation should not require expenditures in excess of what would be required under current response procedures. The commitment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to use these procedures would be necessary.

Recommendation # 64:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that it can examine potential benefits and liabilities pertaining to an interstate compact with existing resources. The resources that would be needed to respond to a disaster in another state or to reimburse costs incurred by another state assisting Florida cannot be determined.
Recommendation # 65:

a. This recommendation can be implemented by the Department of Community Affairs within existing resources.

Recommendation # 66:

a. If special contract provisions can be obtained, it is possible that this recommendation could lead to cost savings.

Recommendation # 67:

a. This recommendation could have very modest cost saving implications when locally declared states of emergency extend beyond ten days.

Recommendation # 68:

a. None. Any incentives provided should be implemented through revisions to distribution formulas as opposed to requiring funds beyond those recommended elsewhere in this report.

Issue C: Security

Recommendation # 69:

a. None.

Recommendation # 70:

a. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Florida National Guard estimate that this recommendation can be implemented within existing resources.

Recommendation # 71:

a. The Florida Department of Transportation estimates that this recommendation can be implemented within existing resources.

Recommendation # 72:

a. The Department of Community Affairs, after consultation with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Florida National Guard, estimates that the fiscal impacts of implementing this recommendation would be relatively minor and could be handled within existing resources.
Recommendation # 73:

a. The Florida National Guard estimates a need for funding of $300,000 annually to implement this recommendation.

Issue D: Expand Civil Liability Protections

Recommendation # 74:

a. None.

Issue E: Improve Federal Programs

Recommendations # 75:

a. None.

Recommendation # 76:

a. None.

Recommendation # 77:

a. None.

Recommendation # 78:

a. None.

Recommendation # 79:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that it can implement its responsibilities under this recommendation with existing staff.

b. The cost to local housing authority and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development should be low as they should have already been considering these issues.
III. AVAILABILITY OF DAMAGE ASSESSMENT DATA

Issue A: Aerial and Ground Damage Assessments

Recommendation # 80:

a. The Department of Community Affairs cannot determine the fiscal impacts of this recommendation at this time. This service may be available through the implementation of the Federal Response Plan at no cost to the state.

Recommendation # 81:

a. Implementation of this recommendation will not involve costs in addition to those currently expended after a major or catastrophic disaster.

Issue B: Increase Use of Computerized Information Systems

Recommendation # 82:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that it can provide support to counties in implementing this recommendation (as defined in paragraph c. of the comments) for a cost of $3.6 million. This includes one systems programmer position, consultant services, and computer hardware and software. These costs are approximate and represent costs above existing and requested resources that can be used to support implementation of this recommendation.

b. Once the data sets are established, users of the information, primarily existing planner positions, would be involved in the maintenance of the data.

c. Costs to others cannot be predicted, but should be reduced from what would be needed if starting from scratch because many counties' property appraisers and other county offices maintain similar data sets for their use. These systems should be designed to be useful for daily activities, not just for emergency purposes.

Recommendation # 83:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that implementation of this recommendation can be accomplished with existing state and local resources.

Recommendation # 84:
a. Implementation of this recommendation will not add additional costs to those already associated with conducting an annual hurricane preparedness and recovery exercise.

**Recommendation # 85:**

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates the cost of implementing this recommendation at $50,000 to $75,000. This would include consultant services needed to prepare the handbook and printing and distribution costs.

**IV. MEDICAL CARE AND RELIEF**

**Issue A: Coordination of Medical Services**

**Recommendation # 86:**

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that implementing this recommendation will have minimal fiscal impacts as the position of State Health Officer currently exists and the position's authority to issue public health advisories exists in section 20.19, Florida Statutes.

b. Costs would be limited to those associated with performance of the duties during a declared emergency and costs associated with any rule making necessary to implement this provision.

**Issue B: Statewide Medical Plan**

**Recommendation # 87:**

a. The Department of Community Affairs included the costs of implementing this recommendation in the fiscal impact for recommendation # 52.

**Issue C: Emergency Pharmacies**

**Recommendation #88:**

a. The Department of Community Affairs determined that the cost of implementing this recommendation should be minimal and within existing resources. Costs to the state would include those related to rule making by appropriate implementing agencies.
V. COORDINATION OF VOLUNTEERS, DONATIONS AND SUPPLIES

Issue A: Effective Receipt and Distribution of Donations

Recommendation # 89:

a. The Department of Community Affairs estimates that implementation of this recommendation should have only minimal fiscal impacts, because the necessary planning and coordination can be performed by existing staff and volunteers.

Recommendation # 90:

a. The Department of Community Affairs has determined that implementation of this recommendation should have only minimal fiscal impacts, because negotiations and planning can be performed by existing staff.

b. In negotiating memoranda of understanding, efforts should be made to have water donated. In any case, fiscal impacts will be limited to the cost of the water supplied, if any, in response to a disaster.

Recommendation # 91:

a. The fiscal impacts of implementing part (a) of this recommendation would vary based on the amount of donations made in response to a given disaster. The Department of Revenue estimates that following a disaster the magnitude of Hurricane Andrew, the potential loss in fuel taxes would be $15,000 in state taxes and $15,000 in local option taxes.

b. The Department of Revenue determined that fiscal impacts of implementing part (a) of this recommendation would be offset to the degree that the state would expend money for fuels in lieu of donations than it would waive in tax payments.

c. The Department of Revenue estimates that the fiscal impacts of implementing part (b) of this recommendation would be minimal because all taxes would remain due.

Recommendation # 92:

a. The Department of Community Affairs has included the cost of implementing this recommendation in the fiscal impact of recommendation # 1.
Issue B: Coordination of Volunteers

Recommendation # 93:

a. Based on information provided to the Department of Community Affairs, it estimates that establishing a volunteer clearinghouse for health care professionals would require two full-time positions with salaries and benefits of $58,630 and an expense budget of $55,857.

b. In order to establish single points of contact for volunteer information, the Department of Community Affairs has determined that implementation of this recommendation should have only minimal fiscal impacts, because negotiations and planning can be performed by existing staff.

c. The Department of Community Affairs determined that the cost of establishing a toll-free telephone bank similar to the one used at the Florida Relief Center would cost approximately $100,000.

d. Other costs associated with the recommendation can be implemented using existing resources and additional resources discussed under numerous previous recommendations.

CHAPTER THREE: FUNDING

I. FLORIDA DEVOTES INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

Issue A: Create an Emergency Management Preparedness and Disaster Assistance Trust Fund

Recommendation # 94:

a. Not applicable.
### APPENDIX B: RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES

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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF MEETINGS

October 12, 1992

The Committee convened for the first time at the Dade County Youth Fair Grounds in Miami, Florida. Opening remarks were provided by Chairman Philip D. Lewis and Lieutenant Governor Buddy MacKay. After introductions, the Committee discussed its workplan for the coming three months and prior legislative actions on emergency management issues.

The Committee spent the remainder of the day examining issues prior to the landfall of Hurricane Andrew, especially the issues of public notification, evacuation and shelter. Presentations were received from: Bob Sheets, Director of the National Hurricane Center; Kate Hale, Director of the Office of Emergency Management, Metro-Dade County; Billy Wagner, Director of the Office of Emergency Management, Monroe County; Bob Nave, Director of the Division of Emergency Management, Florida Department of Community Affairs; Tom Arnold, Deputy Director, Metro-Dade Police Department; Jim Towey, District XI Administrator, and Charles Mahan, Deputy Secretary for Health, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services; Ron Jones, Assistant Secretary for Operations, Florida Department of Corrections; Donna Girodo, Director of Emergency Services, American Red Cross, Dade County Chapter; and Sam Ingram, Director of Safety and Environmental Management, and Mark Zaher, Liaison for Emergency Operations, Dade County School Board.

November 2-3, 1992

The Committee convened for its second and third days of meetings at the South Dade Government Center, Dade County, Florida. The Committee began by receiving and discussing reports from three workgroups established at the prior meeting. The workgroup report on hurricane shutters and public schools was presented by Suzanne Marshall, Bureau Chief, Office of Educational Facilities, Florida Department of Education. The workgroup report on interim evacuation traffic plans was presented by Stan Cann, District 6 Secretary, Florida Department of Transportation. The workgroup report on sheltering people with special needs was presented by Kate Hale, Director, Office of Emergency Management, Metro-Dade County, and Linda Quick, Executive Director, South Florida Health Planning Council. The Committee then discussed additional preliminary recommendations concerning notification, evacuation and shelter.

The Committee then began its examination of post-disaster issues. Communications issues were examined first, particularly the issues of communicating information to the media and the public, improving Florida's Emergency Broadcast System, and improving communications between emergency response agencies. Testimony was received from Toni Riordan, Director of Communications, Florida Department of Community Affairs; Paula Musto, Director of Communications, Metro-Dade County; Frank Koutnik, Chief, Bureau of Operations, Florida Department of Community Affairs; and Bob Nave, Director, Division of Emergency Management, Florida Department of Community Affairs.
On the morning of November 3, 1992, the Committee examined issues pertaining to intergovernmental coordination and chain of command during the first two weeks. Testimony was received from Bob Nave, Director, Division of Emergency Management, Florida Department of Community Affairs; Joaquin Avino, County Manager, Metro-Dade County; Tom Herndon, Chief of Staff, Office of the Governor of Florida; and Howard Chapman, Emergency Management Coordinator, Charleston, South Carolina.

November 23-24, 1992

The Committee convened for its fourth and fifth days of meetings at the Metro-Dade Center for the Fine Arts, Miami, Florida. The Committee began by receiving and discussing reports from workgroups established at the prior meeting. The workgroup report on communications was presented by Bob Nave, Director, Division of Emergency Management, Florida Department of Community Affairs. The workgroup report on damage assessment information was presented by Til Creel, Executive Director, South Florida Water Management District. The workgroup report on chain of command and intergovernmental coordination was presented by Ben Starrett, Director of Strategic Planning and Policy Coordination, Florida Department of Community Affairs. The Committee then discussed additional preliminary recommendations from the previous meeting.

The Committee then moved to an examination of matters pertaining to debris removal and burning and other environmental issues. Presentations were received from: John Ruddell, Director, Division of Waste Management, Florida Department of Environmental Regulation; Tony Clemente, Assistant County Manager, Metro-Dade County; and Major Donald Henninger, Project Manager, Debris Removal, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

The Committee next discussed issues pertaining to medical care and relief. Presentations were received from: Captain Ellery Gray, Senior Emergency Coordinator, U.S. Public Health Service; Mike Williams, Chief of Emergency Medical Services, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida; Bob Millar, Manager for Special Projects, St. Mary's Hospital, West Palm Beach; Sarah Grim, Executive Director, South Florida Hospital Association; and Marta Prado, Vice President, EMSA Limited Partnership.

After reconvening on November 24, 1992, the Committee received a presentation by Alex Muxo, the City Manager of Homestead, concerning the perspective of an impacted community on the Committee's charge.

The Committee moved to an examination of issues pertaining to security. Presentations were received from: Commissioner Tim Moore, Florida Department of Law Enforcement; Major General Ron Harrison, Adjutant General, Florida National Guard; Fred Taylor, Director, Metro-Dade Police Department; and Curt Ivy, Chief of Police, City of Homestead.

The Committee next discussed issues pertaining to temporary housing. Presentations were received from: Michael Polny, Federal Emergency Management Agency; Chris Bezruki, Assistant City Manager/Human Resource Management, City of Homestead; and Lee Rawlingson, Metro-Dade County.
The Committee concluded the meeting with an examination of issues pertaining to distribution of food, water, and other supplies and coordination of volunteers and donations. Presentations were received from: Jon Moyle, Director of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Governor of Florida; Chuck Wolfe, Director, Florida Relief Center; Donald Jones, General Manager, Disaster Services, American Red Cross, National Office; Major Ted Arrowood, Salvation Army; and Tammy Klingler, Senior Vice President for Public Relations, United Way of Dade County.

December 9, 1992

The Committee convened for its sixth day at the Metro-Dade Center for the Fine Arts, Miami, Florida. The Committee began by examining issues pertaining to restoration of electrical power and telephone service. Presentations were received from: Bill Hamilton, Vice President, Customer Service, Residential and General Business, Florida Power and Light; Linda Isenhour, General Manager Southern Network, Southern Bell Florida; Don Riedel, Network Manager, Bell South Mobility; and Fred Mercado, Cellular One. These presentations concluded the testimony gathering phase for the Committee.

The Committee received a presentation on the potential of geographic information systems to improve emergency management planning and damage assessments from staff of the South Florida Water Management District.

During its afternoon session, the Committee reviewed and discussed numerous workgroup reports and recommendations. These reports addressed: communications; intelligence/damage assessment information; improving response to disasters; transportation-related hurricane planning; improving public shelter planning and availability; sheltering people with special needs; medical care and relief; and volunteers and donations.
December 21, 1992

The Committee convened for a public workshop at 7:00 p.m. at the South Dade Government Center, Dade County, Florida. Approximately 30 citizens attended. Testimony was received from: Robert Collins; Lt. Peter E. Smalley, City of Miami Fire Rescue; Ed Hanna, West Perrine/Richmond Heights Community Center; Jonathan Reidy, Alliance for Aging; Honorable John Cosgrove, State Representative, District 119; Patricia M. Stang, Chairman, South Dade Community Council; and Fernando Mendez.

January 6, 1993

The Committee convened for its final meeting at the Metro-Dade Center for the Fine Arts, Miami, Florida. The Committee reviewed, debated, amended and adopted its final report.
APPENDIX D: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A special thanks to Jorge Lopez and Lily Abello, of the Metro-Dade County Manager's Office, for all of their help. The Committee could not have met its charge without their tremendous contribution.

The Committee extends its appreciation to the many individuals who submitted written comments to assist the Committee's deliberations and who participated in the December public workshop.

Finally, the Committee thanks the following speakers, in addition to those persons on the Technical Advisory Committee, who responded to the Committee's requests for testimony:

Tom Arnold, Deputy Director  
Metro-Dade Police Department  
Miami

Sarah Grim, Executive Director,  
South Florida Hospital Association  
Hialeah

Tammy Klingler  
Senior Vice President  
for Public Relations  
United Way of Dade County  
Miami

Major Ted Arrowood  
Salvation Army  
Miami

Major Donald Henninger  
Project Manager, Debris Removal,  
U.S. Army Corp of Engineers  
Miami

Frank Koutnik, Chief  
Bureau of Operations  
Department of Community Affairs  
Tallahassee

Chris Bezruki  
Assistant City Manager  
Human Resource Management  
City of Homestead  
Homestead

Tom Herndon, Chief of Staff,  
Office of the Governor  
Tallahassee

Charles Mahan  
Deputy Secretary for Health,  
Department of Health and  
Rehabilitative Services  
Tallahassee

Howard Chapman  
Emergency Management  
Coordinator, Department of Traffic  
and Transportation  
Charleston, SC

Sam Ingram  
Director of Safety and  
Environmental Management  
Dade County School Board  
Miami

Suzanne Marshall, Bureau Chief,  
Office of Educational Facilities  
Technical Facilities of Development  
and Management, Florida  
Department of Education  
Tallahassee

Tony Clemente  
Assistant County Manager  
Metro-Dade County  
Miami

Linda Isenhour  
General Manager Southern  
Network  
Southern Bell Florida  
Miami

Fred Mercado  
Cellular One  
West Palm Beach

Donna Girodo  
Director of Emergency Services  
Dade County Chapter  
American Red Cross  
Miami

Curt Ivy, Chief of Police  
City of Homestead  
Homestead

Bob Millar  
Manager for Special Projects, St.  
Mary's Hospital  
West Palm Beach

Captain Ellery Gray  
Senior Emergency Coordinator  
U.S. Public Health Service  
Quincy

Ron Jones  
Assistant Secretary for  
Operations  
Department of Corrections  
Tallahassee
Jon Moyle  
*Director of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Governor*  
Tallahassee

Paula Musto  
*Director of Communications*  
Metro-Dade Communications  
Miami

Michael Polny  
*Federal Emergency Management Agency*  
Miami

Marta Prado, *Vice President*  
EMSA Limited  
Plantation

Linda Quick, *Executive Director*  
South Florida Health Planning Council  
Miami

Lee Rawlingson  
*Metro-Dade County*  
Miami

Don Riedel, *Network Manager*  
Bell South Mobility  
Fort Lauderdale

Toni Riordan  
*Director of Communications*  
Department of Community Affairs  
Tallahassee

John Ruddell, *Director*  
Division of Waste Management  
Department of Environmental Regulation  
Tallahassee

Bob Sheets, *Director*  
National Hurricane Center  
Coral Gables

Jim Towey  
*District XI Administrator*  
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services  
Miami

Billy Wagner, *Director*  
Office of Emergency Management  
Monroe County  
Marathon

Mike Williams  
*Chief of Emergency Medical Services*  
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services  
Tallahassee

Chuck Wolfe, *Director*  
Florida Relief Center  
Office of the Governor  
Tallahassee

Mark Zaher  
*Liaison for Emergency Operations*  
Dade County School Board  
Miami
On page 55 of the final report, the introductory paragraph under "IV. Medical Care and Relief" incorrectly implies that the central command center for the South Florida Hospital Association was located at St. Mary's Hospital in Palm Beach County. The South Florida Hospital Association's command center operated out of the Association's offices at 7975 Miami Lakes Drive West, Suite 200, Miami Lakes, Florida 33016.